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Championing the poor: Branding 
around poverty reduction as a 







Malawian national politics since 2005 has featured two presidents, Bingu wa 
Mutharika and Joyce Banda, who quit their respective former parties when 
political rivals impeded their paths to power. Both leaders thereafter 
established new political parties and opted to “brand” them as prioritising 
poverty reduction. These brands—which had programmatic, rhetorical, and 
symbolic components—allowed Mutharika and Banda the possibility of 
achieving a broader national appeal, whereas presidential elections before 
2009 had been decided on the basis of regional patronage networks. 
Mutharika’s brand suggested how he would empower smallholder farmers to be 
able to ensure their own food security. Mutharika achieved this outcome in his 
first term and the voters overwhelmingly returned him to office. A collapsing 
economy in his second term, however, intensified national poverty. Banda’s 
brand was a response to this poverty and suggested how she would be 
committed to alleviating poverty for Malawi’s marginalised groups including 
women. Her “handout” programmes endeared her to some poor Malawians 
who had not benefitted from Mutharika-era growth. The 2014 election result, in 
which 36 percent of the vote was enough to win the presidency, indicates how 
no candidate’s political brand had earned the appeal of a majority of voters. 
Analysis of Afrobarometer survey data reveals that Malawi’s citizens tend to 
prefer government action to address food shortages over the redress of poverty 
directly. Mutharika’s successful efforts to combat food insecurity were 
relatively salient to voters in 2009. Banda’s destitution-centred efforts were less 





In the 2009 election, Malawi’s president Bingu wa Mutharika scored an 
overwhelming victory, winning 66 percent of the vote and clear majorities in 
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the country’s three regions—North, Centre, and South. The margin of victory 
was itself noteworthy: Mutharika won by 35 points over John Tembo of the 
Malawi Congress Party (MCP), by far the widest margin of Malawi’s five 
presidential elections to date. More extraordinary still was the fact that the 
previous three presidential elections had all featured outcomes in which a 
candidate’s regional identity strongly predicted his electoral performance. 
Indeed, no candidate had before earned a plurality of votes outside of his home 
region. Since a plurality of the country inhabits Malawi’s Southern region, the 
three presidential elections prior to 2009 all featured southern winners. 
Mutharika, candidate for the southern-based United Democratic Front (UDF) 
party, had been the latest beneficiary of this regionalism, which had allowed 
him one of the slimmest margins of electoral victory in 2004. 
 
Between 2004 and 2009, it was Mutharika’s ability to champion the interests of 
the country’s largest social demographic—smallholder farmers—that allowed 
the president to transcend the entrenched regional tendencies characterising 
Malawi’s three prior presidential elections.1 The likeliest cause of this electoral 
breakthrough was the Agricultural Input Subsidy Programme (AISP) that the 
Mutharika government (2004-2012) introduced in 2005.2 AISP, which was the 
culmination of previous input subsidy programmes of lesser scope, distributed 
vouchers that farmers could use to purchase fertiliser and food crop seeds at 
(initially) one-quarter of the commercial price. Though the government had 
sponsored input programmes in the past, Mutharika’s unprecedented scope of 
investment in fertiliser subsidies, which more than doubled the country’s maize 
yield from 2005 to 2006, transformed the country from being perennially 
dependent on imported food aid to being secure in its own agricultural 
capacity.3 “Indications of positive impact … of the programme,” Chinsinga 
(2007) noted at the time, “are raising its profile as the magic wand to the 
                                                
1 In Malawi the ratio of rural to urban dwellers is about 4-to-1. Agriculture is by far the most 
common source of livelihood for rural Malawians. Of rural farmers, approximately 9-out-of-
10 practice smallholder agriculture. 
2 The name of the programme was changed to Farm Input Subsidy Programme (FISP) in 
2010. Dyton Maliro, “Comparison of Agricultural Input Subsidies and Social Cash Transfers 
as Policies for Reducing Vulnerability to Hunger in Malawi” (University of East Anglia, 
2011), 2, http://core.kmi.open.ac.uk/download/pdf/2778813.pdf. 
There has been significant literature devoted to the links between AISP/FISP and Mutharika’s 
electoral success. For recent explorations of this topic, see Ferree and Horowitz (2010) and 
Brazys et al. (2015). This paper extends the analyses of these scholars backwards in time, 
elucidating how political competition motivated Mutharika (and then Banda) to brand 
themselves around particular poverty reduction strategies that comprised their respective 
policy agendas. 
3 Ibid., 118. 
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problem of food insecurity.”4 By the end of 2006, not only had Malawians 
produced enough food to feed the country, but when other countries in the 
region were suffering from drought, the government of Malawi was able to 
export maize to them, a pride-affirming phenomenon for a nation that had long 
been accustomed to importing food to meet deficits. When in 2009 Mutharika 
stood for a second term as president, though this time as the candidate for the 
Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), a large majority of voters believed for the 
first time that, in the president’s words, “it is possible for Africa to become the 
food basket of the world.”5 
 
The extraordinary risk that Mutharika took in 2005 to offer subsidised fertiliser 
to farmers, which ultimately engendered a “Green Revolution” across Sub-
Saharan Africa, was the product of Malawi’s particular political circumstances 
in the mid-2000s.6 Though AISP/FISP and the electoral outcomes it has 
engendered have been extensively documented, most notably by Ferree and 
Horowitz (2010) and Brazys et al. (2015), insufficient attention has been paid to 
the role that electoral competition and the donor agenda have played in 
prompting Mutharika to brand himself as the “food security president.”7 This 
paper thus extends the analyses of these scholars backwards in time, elucidating 
how political competition motivated Mutharika to brand himself around an 
enhanced food production-based poverty reduction strategy. 
                                                
4 Blessings Chinsinga, “Reclaiming Policy Space: Lessons from Malawi’s 2005/2006 
Fertilizer Subsidy Programme,” Policy Brief No 13 (2007): 17, 
http://r4d.dfid.gov.uk/pdf/outputs/futureagriculture/fac_research_paper_no6.pdf. 
5 Molalet Tsedeke, “‘It Is Possible for Africa to Become the Food Basket of the World,’ Says 
Mutharika,” Nepad.org, October 28, 2010, 
http://www.nepad.org/foodsecurity/news/1786/%E2%80%9Cit-possible-africa-become-food-
basket-world%E2%80%9D-mutharika. 
6 Jeffrey D. Sachs, “How Malawi Fed Its Own People,” The New York Times, April 19, 2012, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/04/20/opinion/how-malawi-fed-its-own-people.html. 
The idea that AISP had sparked a ‘Green Revolution’ across Africa is likely not to have been 
an exaggeration. Chinsinga noted that input subsidy programmes “hardly featured on the 
policy landscape in 2000, [but] by 2011 10 African countries were spending roughly US$1.05 
billion on ISPs, amounting to 28.6% of their public expenditure on agriculture.” Blessings 
Chinsinga and Colin Poulton, “Beyond Technocratic Debates: The Significance and 
Transience of Political Incentives in the Malawi Farm Input Subsidy Programme (FISP),” 
Development Policy Review 32, no. s2 (November 1, 2014): 123, doi:10.1111/dpr.12079. 
7 Instead of understanding voters as being concerned with particular election issues or 
specific programmes, this analysis understands candidates and parties to be offering 
particular political brands. Voters may understand a candidate to be “pro-poor”—one 
example of a brand—for a variety of reasons that could include consideration of the 
candidate’s programmatic agenda, policy proposals, rhetoric vis-à-vis poor citizens, and 
party/campaign symbolism. Viewing candidates as being representative of political brands 
offers a more holistic paradigm for understanding how and why citizens vote the way they 
do. 
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This instance of political branding, moreover, foreshadowed the political 
branding of Malawi’s most recent former president, Joyce Banda (2012-2014). 
Despite the fact that Mutharika and Banda both founded political parties from 
which they contested for election, there has been a dearth of scholarship 
comparing the two presidents and how they both strove to achieve support from 
a national electorate. Like her predecessor, Banda responded to circumstances 
of intense political competition by pursuing her own poverty reduction brand, 
though hers centred on social protection rather than on food production.8 With 
more competitive candidates in the 2014 race than ever before, Banda was 
under even more pressure than Mutharika to distinguish her candidacy from the 
offerings of her three main political rivals. Though these two cases of 
presidential branding were followed by very different electoral outcomes in 
2009 and 2014, patterns in the behaviour of presidential candidates in the face 
of political competition offers more fundamental insights into the nature of 
elections in Malawi. 
 
 
Ethno-regional politics in Malawi 
 
Though perhaps competitive by regional standards, presidential elections in 
Malawi’s first decade of multiparty competition were altogether predictable. 
Following a 1993 referendum that felled the one-party state of “Life President” 
Hastings Kamuzu Banda (MCP), there emerged among Malawians, noted Osei-
Hwedie (1998), a “strong perception and belief that they can only benefit from 
government jobs, finances and resources if fellow clansmen are in control of the 
political system.”9 From 1964 to 1994, Banda pursued a systematic elevation of 
ethnic Chewa leaders—predominant in the Central region—into the civil 
service while generally excluding leaders from other ethnic groups who inhabit 
Malawi’s Northern and Southern regions.10 After three decades of Chewa 
favouritism, the new political parties that emerged after 1993, including the 
UDF and Alliance for Democracy (AFORD), sought to redistribute the 
                                                
8 There is no consensus definition of which programmes constitute “social protection” in 
Malawi. For the purposes of this paper, social protection programmes refers to programmes 
that are often characterised as “social safety nets” or “cash transfers.” The poverty reduction 
programmes that Joyce Banda introduced as president were either in fact examples of or in 
the style of these kinds of social protection programmes. Though Mutharika’s agricultural 
subsidy programme has sometimes been referred to as “social protection,” for the purposes of 
this analysis AISP/FISP should not be construed as a social protection programme but rather 
as a productivity-enhancing poverty reduction programme. 
9 Bertha Osei-Hwedie, “The Role of Ethnicity in Multi-Party Politics in Malawi and 
Zambia,” Journal of Contemporary African Studies 16, no. 2 (1998): 204–241. Hastings 
Kamuzu Banda is of no relation to the subsequent president, Joyce Banda. 
10 Ibid., 227–228. 
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country’s social and political capital to their constituents who were generally 
not Chewa.11  
 
This balkanised electoral map after 1994 awarded 
the presidency essentially by default to Bakili 
Muluzi, a Yao tribesman from the populous 
Southern region. After the election, in which he 
won 47 percent of the vote, Muluzi adopted 
Banda’s practice of neopatrimonial politics, shoring 
up support in his native region. For instance, as 
Phiri and Edriss (2013) documented, the Muluzi 
presidency featured far higher levels of corruption 
in the civil service than what the country had 
experienced under Banda, allowing the UDF to 
strengthen its ties with tribal leaders from across 
the South.12 The UDF’s war chest, largely pilfered 
from government tenders, allowed Muluzi, as 
Gaynor (2010) argued, to extend a “seemingly 
compassionate” handout campaign toward “needy” 
Malawians.13 The UDF government also acted to 
root out whatever grassroots networks the old 
Banda regime had established in the South, Cammack et al. (2007) argued, by 
abolishing local government councils altogether.14 These practices further 
strengthened support for the president in his home region and can largely 
explain Muluzi’s successful election and re-election bids. The fact that Muluzi’s 
tactics had in this way favoured Malawians of the South over residents of other 
regions perpetuated the system of patronage politics that had theretofore 
characterised Malawi’s political economy. 
 
                                                
11 Karen Ferree and Jeremy Horowitz, “Ties That Bind? The Rise and Decline of Ethno-
Regional Partisanship in Malawi, 1994–2009,” Democratization 17, no. 3 (June 1, 2010): 
534–63, doi:10.1080/13510341003700394. 
12 Horace Phiri and Abdi Khalil Edriss, “Neopatrimonialism and Agricultural Protection,” 
International Food Policy Research Institute, November 2013, 
http://www.ifpri.org/sites/default/files/publications/masspwp1.pdf. 
13 Niamh Gaynor, “Between Citizenship and Clientship: The Politics of Participatory 
Governance in Malawi,” Journal of Southern African Studies 36, no. 4 (December 1, 2010): 
801–16, doi:10.1080/03057070.2010.527637. 
14 Diana Cammack et al., “Neopatrimonial Politics, Decentralisation and Local Government: 
Uganda and Malawi in 2006,” Good Governance, Aid Modalities and Poverty Reduction: 
Linkages to the Millennium Development Goals and Implications for Irish Aid, Research 
Project (RP-05-GG) of the Advisory Board for Irish Aid. Dec, 2007, 
https://blds.ids.ac.uk/files/dmfile/CammacketalGAPWP2.pdf. 
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With an entrenched patronage system presenting strong incentives for voters to 
favour the candidate from their home region, early presidential elections did not 
principally hinge on issues or the policy performance of the UDF-led 
government. Ferree and Horowitz noted how Malawians throughout the 
Northern and Central parts of the country generally approved of Muluzi’s 
performance as president, but at the same time said they would vote for other 
parties in an election.15 The results of one 1994 election exit poll showed how 
regionalised the electorate in fact was: candidates from the North (Chakufwa 
Chihana – AFORD), Centre (Banda), and South (Muluzi) were supported by at 
least two-thirds of voters from their respective home regions.16 Muluzi followed 
his election in 1994 with re-election in 1999 again with robust support from 
Southern voters, despite winning only 11 percent of votes from outside of his 
home region. 
 
In 2004, the UDF won a third-consecutive presidential contest, though this time 
with Muluzi’s protégé Mutharika leading the ticket. While the 2004 race 
featured more presidential contenders than had contested previously, no 
candidate was able to make significant inroads into areas other than where he 
had originated. This allowed Mutharika, Ferree and Horowitz argued, to squeak 
by his rivals with just 36 percent of the vote, predominantly owing to a bloc of 
Southern support.17 Had Mutharika not opted to found his own party (the DPP), 
which measurably increased the competition of Malawi’s elections, the 2009 




The UDF brand: inclusivity for poor Malawians 
 
Though the UDF conducted its politics in a way that reinforced patronage 
networks, Muluzi’s rhetoric and government policies, paradoxically, seemed to 
have been tailored to foster a more universal base of support. This was clear to 
van Donge (1995), who argued that viewing candidates as “merely regional 
phenomena … would overlook their attempts to portray themselves as [being] 
of much wider significance.”18 With the emergence of political competition in 
1994, political parties have crafted party documents and pursued particular 
policies in office that have been distinctive from the offerings of other parties. 
                                                
15 Ferree and Horowitz, “Ties That Bind?” 
16 Afrobarometer, “A Country Turning Blue?: Political Party Support and the End of 
Regionalism in Malawi,” Briefing Paper, (November 2009). 
17 Ferree and Horowitz, “Ties That Bind?” 
18 Jan Kees van Donge, “Kamuzu’s Legacy: The Democratization of Malawi: Or Searching 
for the Rules of the Game in African Politics,” African Affairs, 1995, 227–57. 
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Though the thematic resonance between parties may at times make them seem 
interchangeable, Chunga (2014) argued, increases to political competition over 
time have accompanied candidates’ efforts to become increasingly specialised 
in their policy offerings.19 Branding may not have profoundly altered the 
outcomes of Malawi’s first three presidential elections, but the UDF’s increased 
emphasis on poverty reduction and food security for all Malawians 
differentiated the party from its more elitist MCP rivals and laid the groundwork 
for Mutharika to later foster his own political brand around food production. 
 
As a self-described “underground movement” that liberated Malawi from the 
regime of the autocratic Kamuzu Banda, Muluzi strove to market the UDF as a 
populist response to the classist society over which the old MCP had presided.20 
Muluzi developed a presidential agenda that prioritised poverty alleviation and 
inclusive growth for the masses whose development had been suppressed by the 
ancien régime and its corporatist policies.21 Muluzi’s pursuit of a “pro-poor” 
brand contrasted with that of Banda, whose regime Chinsinga (2012) described 
as being “probably the most repressive regime in the entire southern African 
region.”22 The former government had harboured “no commitment to poverty 
reduction and an aggressive economic growth strategy based on 
industrialisation.”23 Banda’s agricultural policies, moreover, favoured an elite 
class of civil-servant farmers who consolidated tracts of customary land and 
leased it to smallholder farmers, further exacerbating rural poverty.24 Muluzi’s 
brand, which was in part based in the government programmes he endorsed, 
implied that he would undermine these limitations that Banda had erected as 
barriers to inclusive growth. By abolishing the Special Crops Act, for instance, 
Muluzi liberated smallholder farmers to produce cash crops, most notably 
burley tobacco. The previous government had restricted cultivation of cash 
crops to (often white and/or foreign) commercial farmers so as to maximise the 
foreign exchange reserves that facilitated the industrial development projects 
                                                
19 Joseph J. Chunga, “Examining the Relevance of Political Parties in Malawi,” 2014, 
http://afrobarometer.org/files/documents/briefing_papers/afrobriefno125.pdf. 
20 “Malawi Ex-President Muluzi Farewell Speech at UDF Convention,” Malawi Nyasa Times 
- Malawi Breaking News in Malawi, accessed June 1, 2015, 
http://www.nyasatimes.com/2012/10/31/malawi-ex-president-muluzi-farewell-speech-at-udf-
convention/. 
21 Blessings Chinsinga, “The Political Economy of Agricultural Policy Processes in Malawi: 
A Case Study of the Fertilizer Subsidy Programme,” 2012, 
http://mobile.opendocs.ids.ac.uk/opendocs/handle/123456789/2249. 
22 Ibid. 
23 Mick Foster et al., “Poverty Reduction Strategy and Public Expenditure in Five African 
Countries,” 2002, 5, http://www.odi.org/sites/odi.org.uk/files/odi-assets/publications-opinion-
files/2051.pdf. 
24 Phiri and Edriss, “Neopatrimonialism and Agricultural Protection,” 1. 
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taking place in Lilongwe.25 Branding against the legacy of this top-down 
regime, Muluzi suggested that the UDF would be a populist “Front” that was 
dedicated to uplifting poor Malawians. 
 
In addition to undoing the old MCP policies that marginalised poor farmers, 
Muluzi pursued an extensive social protection infrastructure prioritising poverty 
alleviation for the able-bodied poor. According to Chirwa and Dorward (2013), 
the “failures by [Banda’s] policies in dealing with core poverty/vulnerability 
and food security problems” affirmed Malawi’s place as the poorest country in 
southern Africa.26 In 1998, over 65 percent of the country still lived on less than 
US$1 per day (“poor”) while nearly 29 percent were living on half of that 
(“extremely poor”).27 In an open letter headlining the party’s 1999 manifesto 
(“Eradicating Poverty”), Muluzi stated how the party had “in line with our 1994 
campaign pledges … decided to make poverty alleviation priority number one 
in all our development policies.”28 He highlighted in the letter two programmes 
that were targeted at Malawi’s able-bodied poor. The first programme was the 
“now famous and highly successful” Starter Pack Scheme (SPS), which 
provided to farmers 2.86 million packs containing enough seeds and fertiliser to 
farm 0.1ha of land.29 The government’s initial (1998) share of spending on the 
programme was 56 percent (US$14.5 million) with the rest being supported by 
a consortium of donors led by DFID.30 The programme was able to achieve in 
its earliest manifestation, Devereux and Macauslan (2006) noted, sufficient 
output to furnish 16 percent of all smallholder farming yield.31 This was “not 
enough for national self-sufficiency, but enough to close the food gap 
substantially.”32 By the 1999 election, Malawians were remarking on “Muluzi 
maize,” and the SPS “featured highly in the political campaigns of both 
                                                
25 Ibid.; UDF Election Manifesto, 1994. 
26 Ephraim Chirwa and Andrew Dorward, Agricultural Input Subsidies: The Recent Malawi 
Experience (Oxford University Press, 2013), 69. 
27 “1998 Integrated Household Survey and Poverty Analysis” (National Statistics Office, 
1998), http://www.nsomalawi.mw/publications/integrated-household-survey/1998-integrated-
household-survey.html. 
28 UDF Election Manifesto, 1999. 
29 Catherine Longley, John Coulter, and Roy Thompson, “Malawi Rural Livelihoods Starter 
Pack Scheme 1998-99 Evaluation Report,” ODI, London, 1999, 1, 
http://www.reading.ac.uk/ssc/n/TIP%20Archive%20CD/related%20materials/SP1/SPS1%20
evaluation%20report/evaluation%20report.pdf. 
30 Jane Harrigan, “Food Insecurity, Poverty and the Malawian Starter Pack: Fresh Start or 
False Start?,” Food Policy 33, no. 3 (June 2008): 245, doi:10.1016/j.foodpol.2007.09.001. 
31 Stephen Devereux and Ian Macauslan, “Review of Social Protection Instruments in 




government and opposition candidates.”33 Not only did SPS help to characterise 
the Muluzi brand, but it supplied an important programmatic precedent for 
Bingu wa Mutharika’s more expansive AISP. 
 
In addition to prioritising the empowerment of smallholder farmers, Muluzi 
emphasised relief and inclusivity for Malawians not otherwise engaged in 
farming practices. The other programme that Muluzi touted in the UDF 
manifesto was the Malawi Social Action Fund (MASAF). A public employment 
programme funded largely by the World Bank, MASAF was the central pillar of 
the “Poverty Alleviation Programme” that Muluzi launched in August 1996. An 
infusion of US$68 million from the World Bank in 1999 to ensure that the 
programme (MASAF II) would continue through 2003 transformed the 
programme into Malawi’s “major social safety net,” according to Maliro 
(2011).34 Muluzi’s characterisation of MASAF, moreover, as a “delivery 
vehicle for reaching out to the masses” and “a true example of bottom-to-top 
democracy” further evidenced the president’s attempts to build up the UDF’s 
pro-poor brand. 
 
Both SPS and MASAF benefitted poor Malawians who had generally been 
ignored under the ancien régime, yet their respective shortcomings perhaps 
limited their usefulness in driving a broader base of support for the ruling party. 
In the case of SPS, the effectiveness of the programme to target the poorest 
households was limited. Because of the untargeted (or universal) nature of the 
programme, much of the smallholder production was achieved by relatively 
wealthier households who had the requisite baseline of land and labour to 
cultivate a higher output.35 As the 1998-1999 ODI review of the SPS concluded, 
many households at the more extreme end of the vulnerability spectrum 
received starter packs, but they lacked sufficient land on which to cultivate a 
yield sufficient enough to surmount food insecurity. Moreover, while SPS did 
enhance yield across many thousands of households, Malawi was still running a 
deficit of between 500,000 and 600,000 tonnes of maize every year.36 While 
SPS undoubtedly improved conditions for farmers across the country who had 
suffered Banda’s exclusivist policies, the benefits were not sufficient to prompt 
a significant change in the party’s electoral support base. 
 
Nor did the UDF seem able to translate benefits from the MASAF employment 
programmes into support from a wider base of voters. MASAF, like SPS, 
                                                
33 Longley, Coulter, and Thompson, “Malawi Rural Livelihoods Starter Pack Scheme 1998-
99 Evaluation Report,” 42–43. 
34 Maliro, “Comparison of Agricultural Input Subsidies and Social Cash Transfers as Policies 
for Reducing Vulnerability to Hunger in Malawi,” 65. 
35 Devereux and Macauslan, “Review of Social Protection Instruments in Malawi,” 5. 
36 Ibid., 4. 
 10 
suffered from operational shortcomings, often failing to target communities 
with deeper levels of poverty. Kishindo (2000) found that Blantyre District—
the South’s largest district and at the time a UDF stronghold—had received the 
largest proportion of MASAF funding in the country.37 Moreover, the fact that 
45 percent of total MASAF spending went to projects in the South likely served 
only to reinforce Muluzi’s existing electoral support base. This programmatic 
reinforcement of regional loyalties in fact probably stymied the party’s attempts 
to foster a more geographically diverse mix of supporters.  
 
Whatever improvements to food security that the Muluzi government had 
achieved through SPS were short-lived, however. Donor pressure forced the 
SPS to be scaled back to almost one-quarter of its original budget (US$7.2 
million) in 2001, according to Harrigan (2008), ostensibly out of concern that 
the programme was inhibiting rural livelihood diversification away from maize 
production,.38 Led by the IMF and USAID, these donors successfully pressured 
government to cancel SPS and adopt the more limited Targeted Input 
Programme (TIP) that could better target extreme poverty. The transition 
reduced yields to such a degree that total smallholder production owed to 
government subsidies fell from 16 to 3 percent.39 In addition to decreasing 
overall food availability, the fall in output also sparked a near quintupling of 
maize prices from October 2001 to March 2002. For smallholder farmers who 
must rely on purchased maize during the lean months of the year (December-
February), this price hike precipitated thousands of hunger-related deaths 
between 2000 and 2002, which was only partially mitigated by (late-arriving) 
emergency food aid totalling 195,000 tonnes in 2002.40  
 
This crisis of the early decade deepened political elites’ suspicions that the 
donors could not be trusted to ensure Malawi’s food security.41 With the 2004 
election on the horizon, according to Chirwa and Dorward (2013), “fertiliser 
politics” became the main feature of the campaign.42 While the donor agenda 
demanded greater austerity toward smallholder development, political elites 
                                                
37 Paul Kishindo, “Community Project Funding in Malawi under the Malawi Social Action 
Fund (MASAF) Demand-Driven Approach: Potential for Perpetuating Imbalances in 
Development,” Journal of Social Development in Africa 15, no. 1 (2000): 11–13. 
38 Harrigan, “Food Insecurity, Poverty and the Malawian Starter Pack,” 244. 
39 Malawi’s GDP declined by 5.0 percent in 2001. Devereux and Macauslan, “Review of 
Social Protection Instruments in Malawi.” 
40 “Unravelling the ‘miracle’ of Malawi’s Green Revolution” (GRAIN, January 14, 2010), 
http://www.grain.org/article/entries/4075-unravelling-the-miracle-of-malawi-s-green-
revolution. 
41 Chinsinga, “The Political Economy of Agricultural Policy Processes in Malawi.” 
42 Chirwa and Dorward, Agricultural Input Subsidies, 67–68. 
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including the UDF’s new presidential candidate Mutharika were undoubtedly 
considering different approaches.  
Bingu wa Mutharika, champion of the smallholder 
farmer 
 
With the announcement on 25 May that Bingu wa Mutharika had won the 2004 
presidential election, Malawi was at the cusp of a new era. The UDF stalwart 
and co-founder of the party with Muluzi was the latter’s choice to succeed him 
as president, especially after attempts to change the Constitution to allow for 
Muluzi to run for a third term were thwarted in the constitutional court.43 
Mutharika had trained overseas in Development Economics and served 
                                                
43 Janet Chikaya-Banda, “Duty of Care: Constitutional and Law Reform, in Malawi,” Africa 
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thereafter as a civil servant in Banda’s MCP government.44 But he soon became 
an activist against the government he purported to represent and thereafter was 
forced into exile in Zambia, joining that country’s corps of technocratic elites. 
He joined the UDF in 1992 (before it became a sanctioned political party), 
having re-entered Malawi via postings as UN Director of Trade and 
Development Finance for Africa and as Secretary General of COMESA during 
the 1990s. After a falling out with Muluzi, Mutharika tested the waters of 
presidential politics in 1999 as the candidate for the United Party (which he 
founded), though he garnered less than 1 percent of the vote in the election. 
After a rapprochement between the two UDF men in 2000, a re-elected Muluzi 
tendered Mutharika a deputy governorship in the Reserve Band of Malawi and 
later a cabinet position as Minister of Economic Planning and Development 
before hand-picking him as his presidential successor. 
 
Following the food crisis of the early decade, food security was a top issue in 
the 2004 election.45 Though both major parties supported input subsidies of 
some variety, language in the MCP manifesto suggested that the SPS had been 
“prone to waste and abuse” and that an MCP government would “work to 
implement targeted subsidies for those that [sic] really need them.”46 For their 
part, the UDF had rebelled against the narrower TIP, promising in 2004 to 
implement a nationwide fertiliser subsidy—though, according to Booth et al. 
(2006), without having undertaken technical analysis of how it would be 
implemented.47 Yet a new focus on fertiliser stood to resonate strongly with the 
populace. Longley et al. (1999), in their evaluation of the SPS, emphasised how 
“there is little doubt that there will be need for greatly increased inputs as 
suggested for the supply of fertilisers.”48 In another study, Bookstein and 
Lawson (2002) recorded how in discussion groups in Zambia and Malawi, 
access to fertiliser was mentioned more often than even hunger as being a chief 
societal concern.49 
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Though Muluzi and Mutharika had just barely earned the UDF a presidential 
third term, their partnership ended within nine months of Mutharika’s entering 
office. Muluzi, who had been declared ineligible for a third term, took a page 
out of his Zambian counterpart Frederick Chiluba’s political playbook, 
campaigning on behalf of a hand-picked successor over whom he intended to 
wield ultimate control.50 Intimating his intention to metaphorically keep the 
keys to the State House, Muluzi had after 2004 maintained his leadership of the 
party.51 This allowed him to once again pen the opening letter of the UDF 
manifesto, though he did so without ever mentioning Mutharika’s name. Not 
many Malawians either expected to see Mutharika demonstrate ultimate 
leadership. Noted one observer, Mutharika “was seen as somebody who was 
going to be led by Muluzi.”52 To the surprise of many observers therefore, 
Mutharika decided to disavow his patron Muluzi. In February 2005, while 
serving as state president, Mutharika resigned his membership in the UDF and 
founded the DPP.53 
 
In addition to the intraparty competition that motivated the politically ambitious 
Mutharika to found the DPP, interparty competition also lowered the 
opportunity cost for the new president to establish his own party. Though the 
UDF had claimed a third presidential victory in 2004, the party in the election 
lost its parliamentary plurality, winning 49 seats to the MCP’s 57 seats (of 187 
total seats) despite getting about 15,000 more votes. With such a weak mandate 
to rule, Mutharika suffered little risk to his personal political capital in 
divorcing himself from the UDF mantle. 
 
Lacking much support in parliament and without grassroots party structures, 
Mutharika had little choice but to foster an electoral base that relied on policy 
performance in lieu of patronage politics. To achieve this goal, Mutharika 
cultivated a political brand that could appeal to the largest demographic of 
Malawians; i.e., smallholder farmers. Extending the food security platform that 
the UDF had fostered as a response to the Banda-MCP’s restrictive agricultural 
policies, Mutharika marketed the DPP as Malawi’s champion of smallholder 
farmers. Resonant with the fertiliser debate that had been a seminal part of the 
2004 campaign, Mutharika chose for his DPP a party logo featuring four maize 
cobs, suggesting that food production would occupy the principal focus of his 
                                                
50 Daniel Vencovsky, “Presidential Term Limits in Africa,” 2007, 8, 
http://reference.sabinet.co.za/webx/access/electronic_journals/accordc/accordc_2007_n2_a4.
pdf. 
51 In very few cases since 1994 has the president of the country not simultaneously served as 
president of his/her political party. 
52 “Malawi’s President Rules ‘His Way,’” BBC, September 1, 2004, sec. Africa, 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/3618948.stm. 
53 Chikaya-Banda, “Duty of Care: Constitutional and Law Reform, in Malawi.” 
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party’s platform. Within the first three years of his presidency, moreover, 
Mutharika had taken over the Minister of Agriculture and Food Security 
portfolio himself, a post he retained until April 2010.54 Remarking on his vision 
for the country, Mutharika declared: 
 
‘In 2004, this government inherited an agricultural sector that was 
characterised by chronic food deficits and this resulted in perpetual 
food insecurity. In addition, the country did not have sufficient seed, 
particularly maize and relied heavily on seed importation. … Right 
from the beginning, we had to convince Malawians that this country 
had the potential to feed itself’.55 
 
The fact also that Malawians were suffering in 2005 the worst drought in recent 
memory—farmers produced just 37 percent of the country’s food 
requirement—meant that Mutharika’s recognition of food security as a 
paramount issue proved particularly auspicious.56 
 
The chief policy manifestation of Mutharika’s food security brand was AISP. In 
advance of the 2005/06 growing season (December-April), the Mutharika 
government launched AISP with an infusion of US$32 million, or about two-
and-a-half times the government’s expenditure on SPS in 1998/99. Each of the 
2.8 million beneficiaries (about 50% of smallholder farmers) in the 
programme’s first year was allotted vouchers that would subsidise two 50-kg 
bags of fertiliser and 2.0 kg of hybrid or 4.5 kg of open pollinated seed at a 
quarter of the market price.57 As compared to SPS and TIP, the AISP packs 
were much larger and allowed more farmers the materials they needed to 
achieve food sufficiency, which was not to same degree the case with SPS.58 
Mutharika’s decision to leverage such a considerable amount of funding to 
subsidies given Malawi’s constrained budget space was risky, but it was only 
with this scope of financing that maize yields could elevate to the point of 
making Malawi’s poor farmers self-sufficient. In the following fiscal year 
(2006/07), spending on AISP more than doubled to US$73.9 million, 
comprising nearly half of the Ministry of Agriculture (MoAFS) budget and 
almost 7 percent of the national budget.59 
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59 Chart adapted from Chirwa and Dorward, Agricultural Input Subsidies, 120. Malawi’s 





The risk may have been high, but so was the reward, as it turned out. Maize 
yields more than doubled from 1.2 million metric tons in 2004/05 before the 
introduction of the subsidies to 2.7 million in 2005/06 and then 3.4 million in 
2006/07.60 Chirwa and Dorward (2013) found that households receiving 
subsidised fertilisers were able to achieve food adequacy in about 22-percent 
more cases than non-recipient households.61 Food security on the whole 
increased for an estimated 67 percent of AISP farmers. Production for many 
smallholders was sufficient in fact to allow them to become net sellers of maize, 
able to market their surplus production during the year without having to 
purchase maize during the lean period.62 For a nation that had run food 
production deficits for several years prior to 2005, the fact that the nation’s 
farmers were thereafter growing surplus food year after year was a considerable 
change for the once perennially food-starved country.63 Moreover, by the late 
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2000s, as Cammack (2012) noted, subsidies had allowed more smallholders 
farmers to produce tobacco and cotton, the export of which facilitated the rise of 
many farmers above smallholder status.64 Mutharika had ensured the confidence 
of his people that Malawi would not starve, but perhaps more powerful still was 




Mutharika and the donors 
 
Not only did partisan competition from both intraparty and interparty sources 
provide strong impetus for Mutharika to brand himself around enhancing food 
productivity, but competition with donors over Malawi’s development strategy 
underpinned the president’s decision to champion smallholder farmers. When 
donors led by the IMF and USAID shifted tack in the early 2000s and pushed 
for the narrower TIP as a replacement for SPS, the price of maize rose 
significantly.65 Muluzi at the time had acceded to the donor agenda, perhaps 
trusting that his robust support base in the Southern region would be sufficient 
to guarantee that the UDF would continue at the head of government. Indeed, 
despite the food crisis that had transpired under his watch in 2001-2002, Muluzi 
still enjoyed an 82-percent approval rating among Southerners in 2003, 
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according to Afrobarometer data.66 Mutharika, by contrast, lacked the grassroots 
support that Muluzi had enjoyed, especially once he had dropped the UDF 
mantle. According to the Afrobarometer survey recorded in 2005, the newly-
minted DPP leader had just a 48-percent approval rating among southerners. 
Mutharika’s political career could thus ill-afford another food-related 
catastrophe like the ones that had occurred earlier in the decade. With fertiliser 
subsidies having been a seminal election issue in 2004, moreover, inaction was 
not a realistic option. The incentives were therefore aligned for Mutharika to 
pursue an input subsidy programme that was of a much grander scope than what 
Muluzi before him had attempted. 
 
Though upsetting the donors carried with it the risk of losing the critical 
budgetary support that sustains Malawi’s public programmes, Mutharika 
determined nonetheless that the risk was justified. For Mutharika, subsidies 
were a means by which the nation could emerge from donor dependency and 
enhance national pride. As the president enunciated in his 2008 State of the 
Nation Address, “Government placed the highest priority on agriculture to 
guarantee national and household food security … because a nation that 
depends on others for food cannot achieve ‘national sovereignty.’”67 Following 
a poor crop season in 2004-2005 from which nearly 40 percent of the country (5 
million people) became unable to meet their basic food needs, Mutharika 
decided that he would take Malawi on a bolder policy course than any that had 
been followed before.68 When the donors insisted in 2005 that the government 
accept more food aid instead of offering subsidies, the president reportedly 
declared, “Enough is enough. I am not going to go on my knees to beg for food. 
Let us grow the food ourselves.”69 
 
Following the first round of fertiliser subsidies in 2005, after which it became 
clear that Mutharika would not be changing tack, the donors began to provide 
limited financial support for AISP/FISP. Ahead of the 2009 election, the first 
test for the DPP, Mutharika defended his insistence on offering subsidies to 
smallholder farmers: 
 
                                                
66 See Ferree and Horowitz, “Ties That Bind?,” 551 for survey data. 
67 State of the Nation Address, 2008. 
68 Chirwa and Dorward, Agricultural Input Subsidies, 161. Gondwe in his 2006 Budget 
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‘I knew we were right. If you look at the smallholder farmers here, 
using a hoe… I mean a poor woman with a baby on her back, 
struggling the whole day and she cannot afford to buy improved 
seeds, she cannot afford to buy fertilisers … she cannot even afford 
small improvements in agricultural implements other than a hoe and 
then you [the development partners] come and say ‘that woman does 
not need subsidy.’ Then you take the farmers in Europe and North 
America with modern trucks … you say they need subsidy and this 
woman doesn’t? … I say “No, they are not serious.… With or without 
your support, I’ll go ahead and do it anyway”’.70 
 
Goodall Gondwe, the longstanding Minister of Finance and architect of AISP, 
echoed Mutharika’s insistence that all Malawians be empowered to grow food 
themselves. In his 2007-2008 Budget Address, Gondwe reflected on how AISP 
had driven a “huge increase in our maize production … a remarkable 
achievement for the country.” He noted further how Malawians “no longer have 
to beg for handouts from our neighbours or our overseas friends.” Fertiliser 
subsidies, he declared further, were “transforming the country, beginning with 
maize, from a consuming and importing country to a producing and exporting 
country.”71 Indeed, the boon to maize yields over the first three years of the 
programme had allowed MoAFS to purchase 400,000 tonnes of surplus maize 




The Mutharika brand and the 2009 presidential 
election 
 
Three aspects of political competition thus precipitated Mutharika’s efforts to 
foster a political brand around food security. First, intraparty competition 
between Muluzi and Mutharika prompted the latter to assert his independence 
through the founding of a new political party. Mutharika inherited the UDF’s 
redistributive food security platform, expanded it through programmatic and 
symbolic means, and cultivated it as a new political brand around the DPP. 
Second, interparty competition forced Mutharika to abandon the strategy of 
patronage politics that had driven electoral outcomes over the past decade 
because his upstart DPP had no established grassroots support. The intense 
                                                
70 Interview with Bingu wa Mutharika. See EXCLUSIVE: Malawi President - Bingu Wa 
Mutharika, 2009, 
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72 Chirwa and Dorward, Agricultural Input Subsidies, 150. 
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interparty competition reflected in the 2004 presidential election result also 
lowered the cost to Mutharika’s defection from the UDF as he did not inherit a 
plurality (let alone a majority) in the National Assembly. Third, competition 
between the Mutharika government and the IMF-led donors who had put 
Malawi on a course of limited agricultural development with disastrous 
unintended consequences earlier in the decade spurred Mutharika to assert his 
independence through bold policies that defied the agenda of these donors. 
Mutharika’s decision to forge a unilateral development agenda further 
burnished his credentials as Malawi’s food production president. 
 
The president’s political and financial gamble in unilaterally implementing 
AISP bore fruit. Whereas in 2004-2005 the nation faced the prospect of famine, 
within two years the country’s smallholder farmers were producing enough 
maize to feed themselves. The president’s popularity among the rural masses 
soared, Chirwa and Dorward noted.73 Mutharika soon acquired popular 
monikers such as Mose wa lero (“a modern Moses”) for his ability to deliver the 
people from food insecurity and Chitsulo cha njanji (“an iron rail”) for having 
confronted the IMF and other development partners who had insisted Malawi 
take a more conservative course.74 East China Normal University in 2010 
awarded the president an honorary professorship in Economics for his 
development vision, for which Mutharika thereafter stylised himself as 
“Professor.”75 This title soon accompanied Ngwazi (the “Conqueror”) for his 
having conquered hunger, a title which Mutharika apparently adopted himself 
but one that nonetheless entered public discourse.76 This title, which only the 
autocratic Banda had embraced before Mutharika and foreshadowed the latter’s 
more authoritarian path, came to Mutharika by way of the Ngoni tribe who 
inhabit the Northern and Central regions of Malawi. The fact that Mutharika, 
who was Lomwe by tribe and a southerner, stylised himself Ngwazi suggests 
perhaps how the president intended to appeal to a geographically broader array 
of voters. 
 
In the lead-up to the 2009 election, Mutharika as presidential candidate for the 
DPP upped the government’s ante in promoting agricultural self-sufficiency. 
The prior year, the DPP government scaled up spending on AISP to more than 
230 percent of what it had spent on inputs during the prior fiscal year (2007/08). 
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The approximately US$250 million that government spent on subsides in that 
year alone comprised more than 16 percent of all government expenditure, 
exceeding the budgets of entire ministries including that of Health and 
Education (respectively).77 Much of Mutharika’s campaign was also focused on 
his government’s food production achievements. In the DPP’s 2009 election 
manifesto, Mutharika declared that the government would “ensure that we feed 
ourselves … continuing its policy focus towards enabling more people to grow 
their own food.”78 Indeed, the government announced before the election that it 
would be increasing the rate of subsidy from 75 to 90 percent, providing a 
strong incentive, argued Maliro (2011), for smallholder farmers to support the 
DPP in 2009. 
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Malawi’s economic collapse and the fall of Bingu wa 
Mutharika, 2009-2012 
 
Following the 2009 election in which voters overwhelmingly returned the 
Mutharika to the presidency and elected 114 of the DPP’s parliamentary 
candidates, a once-ascendant Malawi began to slip into social discord. Whereas 
political competition had motivated the president to advance a policy vision 
based on national food security, Mutharika in his second term, Chinsinga and 
Poulton (2014) argued, lost the political incentive to lead a government 
predicated on performance and not patronage.79 As Shawa (2012) and many 
others have documented, Mutharika after 2009 adopted an increasingly “big 
man” style of politics.80 Mutharika’s decision to purchase a presidential jet and 
mausoleum with public funds, his shuttering of Chancellor College when 
faculty there made critical statements about his leadership, and his attempt to 
position his brother Peter Mutharika—a law professor in the United States who 
had returned to Malawi to become a Cabinet minister—as presumptive DPP 
presidential candidate in 2014 were just some of the ways in which Mutharika 
deepened public criticism of his leadership, especially among the urban middle 
class and international observers. 
 
Whatever popularity Mutharika had fostered by the end of his first term was 
quickly eroding in his second term. Mutharika’s decision to impose national 
price floors on burley tobacco, ostensibly to support smallholder farmers, 
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backfired when wholesalers refused to pay high prices and left the country. 
Without tobacco sales, which are Malawi’s principal source of foreign 
exchange, currency reserves plummeted and the government could no longer 
import sufficient quantities of petroleum, medicine, and manufacturing inputs. 
Cammack (2012) noted too how many farmers who had expanded into 
commercial production with the help of fertiliser subsidies suffered as the 
country lacked sufficient fuel that they needed to bring their crops to market.81 
Government also faced challenges in transporting fertiliser to rural markets for 
sale. The economic and social consequences of Mutharika’s brazenness proved 
dire. Hospitals exhausted medical supplies, factories shuttered, and taxis queued 
for days in wait for fuel, spurring protests. Mutharika lost further credibility 
when suppression of the 20-21 July 2011 protests in several cities resulted in the 
deaths of 20 people.82 
 
 
Turmoil in the economy as well as the diminishing marginal returns of FISP—
which had faced procedural issues for years—also proceeded to erase the 
reductions to poverty that the Mutharika government had theretofore achieved. 
Growth of the economy, which had reached an impressive rate of nine percent 
in the mid-2000s, had by 2012 slipped to nearly four percent.83 Poverty also had 
fallen during Mutharika’s first term, but slippages in growth forced many tens 
of thousands of vulnerable Malawians back into poverty, especially in the rural 
areas.84 The 2010/11 Integrated Household Survey (IHS) showed that the 
national poverty rate (50.7%) had decreased only marginally since 2004/5 
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(52.4%).85 This was likely because, as Dorward and Chirwa concluded in a 
2013 evaluation of the programme, FISP “helps poor people with problems of 
food insecurity … but the scale of the programme … is not large enough to … 
allow people to advance their livelihoods. This may be characterised as helping 
people to ‘hang in’ but not ‘step up’ or ‘step out’ [from poverty].”86 FISP may 
have saved lives, but the fact that it had not resulted in changes to the structure 
of the economy left most Malawians unable to emerge from livelihood 
insecurity. 
 
With Malawi’s economy in a tailspin, the country was desperate for stability to 
return. Yet Mutharika in 2011, as he had in 2005, once again spurned the IMF-
led development partners when they tried to intervene in the country’s 
economic affairs. The IMF, having declared the kwacha to be overvalued, 
offered the Malawian government a US$79 million relief package in exchange 
for the government’s devaluation of the currency. Mutharika balked, claiming 
that “unless the IMF tells me how I will protect my people, I will not devalue 
the Kwacha.”87 Prices continued to increase and shortages worsened when the 
donors decided to withhold all direct foreign budgetary assistance to the 
government in the 2011-12 fiscal year, highly problematic for a country that 
relies on donors to supply about 40 percent of its annual budget.88 Mutharika 
exacerbated the situation when he expelled the British High Commissioner, who 
had criticised the president for “becoming ever more autocratic and intolerant of 
criticism.”89 As a result, Britain withdrew about US$30 million in aid from 
Malawi. The president, who by this time had well established as part of his 
leadership brand a resistance to foreign involvement in Malawi’s economic 
affairs, publicly embraced the donor freeze as part of his “Zero-Deficit Budget” 
to get the country on a path to financial independence.90 But when on 5 March 
2012 Mutharika told a group of development partner representatives to “go to 
hell,” every Malawian recognised that the country was indeed on shaky 
footing.91 
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Then suddenly, to the shock of all, though perhaps not to their dismay, President 
Mutharika suffered a heart attack and died on 5 April 2012. 
 
 
Joyce Banda and Malawi’s newest “pro-poor” 
brand 
 
After Mutharika’s death, a very different kind of leader emerged to take his 
place. It was clear that the vice-president Joyce Banda, who was sworn in as 
president on 7 April, would bring a different approach to national governance as 
compared to her high-handed predecessor. “The Joyce Banda I have come to 
know,” commented blogger Kondwani Munthali shortly after the new president 
had entered office, “is the mother who speaks on empowering the poor … who 
removed all the trappings of the Vice Presidency and went to sit down on a mat 
in Ndirande to console a … victim of Police brutality.”92 Against the backdrop 
of Mutharika’s ostentation and the spiralling state of the economy, it seemed 
that Banda would offer the succour that the nation’s poor majority needed. 
 
Mutharika had chosen Banda as his running mate in 2009 to “support women in 
the country and because of her experience,” but the president had little interest 
in keeping Banda around once the election had ended.93 When the vice-
president would not kowtow to Mutharika’s wishes that she endorse his brother 
Peter to be the next DPP nominee, the president ejected her from the party in 
December 2010. Despite her banishment from the DPP, Banda resisted calls for 
her resignation, declaring that “her responsibility … constitutionally mandates 
her to fight for the well being [sic] of the ordinary Malawian.”94 It was this 
dedication to the welfare of Malawi’s ordinary citizens—a stark contrast with 
what Mutharika had offered the country in his final years—that characterised 
the Banda political brand. 
 
As had been the case in the mid-2000s, circumstances of political competition 
shaped how Banda came to market her particular vision for the country. When 
competition within the DPP forced her out of the party, Banda took a page out 
of Mutharika’s own political playbook and in September 2011 founded the 
People’s Party (PP) with herself as party president. Interparty competition too 
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moved Banda to project a different kind of brand. With three major parties, each 
of which having provided Malawi with one of its presidents, dominating the 
electoral space, Banda’s ambitions for a presidential term of her own in 2014 
necessitated that she demonstrate to the electorate how her PP would be 
distinctive of what the other parties could offer. Distancing herself from her 
more socially elite peers, Banda professed to best understand the challenges that 
ordinary Malawians face: 
 
I know the kind of suffering that women are going through in this country. 
Their suffering does not need any introduction to me. I am the best advocate of 
the poor because I know what poverty is. I have fought against this, and will 
continue to fight.95 
 
Banda’s pursuit of a “pro-poor” agenda as president proceeded from a career 
spent advocating for improvements to the welfare of poor Malawians. A Yao 
and native of Zomba District in Malawi’s Central region, Banda’s ability to 
overcome significant odds and achieve social and material success underlay her 
dedication to helping others surmount the kinds of challenges she had faced. 
Banda managed to finish secondary school all while mothering three children 
by the age of 25.96 She thereafter left an abusive marriage, remarried, and 
opened a textile manufacturing company workshop that came to employ over 
one hundred people. The future president was by this point “empowered on 
many levels” and made it her “mission in life to assist women and youth to gain 
social and political empowerment.”97 In the 1980s, Banda founded the National 
Association of Business Women (NABW)—the largest network of rural women 
in the country with more than 50,000 members—and co-founded the Young 
Women Leaders Network and the Hunger Project.98 The Joyce Banda 
Foundation, which since 1997 has provided meals and care for thousands of 
orphans and vulnerable children, earned Banda a Goodwill Ambassadorship for 
Safe Motherhood from the African Union.99 
 
The future president’s decision to join politics was as an outgrowth of her work 
as an activist and philanthropist. “For me,” Banda noted, “the motivation in 
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taking up that opportunity [to pursue a career in politics] was to be involved in 
influencing laws that have a big impact on women and children.”100 Banda 
entered politics in the 1990s as an MP with the UDF and joined the DPP in the 
mid-2000s.101 She entered Cabinet mid-way through Mutharika’s first term, first 
as Minister of Gender, Child Welfare and Community Development and then as 
Minister of Foreign Affairs before being elected the vice-president in 2009. 
Despite her rapid climb up the political ladder, Banda drew condemnation from 
political rivals who insinuated that her background did not befit a president. 
“She will never be president,” commented Mutharika’s widow and government 
official Callista Chimombo.102 “How can a mandasi [fritter] seller be 
president?” But Banda turned around the characterisation, declaring that “she is 
right, because I’ve spent thirty years of my life empowering rural women. If I 
am aligned with the majority of women who struggle everyday … that’s fine, 
that’s my mission.”103 Whereas her predecessor Mutharika had been a 
bombastic male leader and technocrat, Banda efforts to portray herself as 
sympathetic to the plight of poor women offered Malawian politics a new 
presidential brand. 
 
Banda indicated in her first State of the Nation Address (May 2012) how her 
government would be different from that of her predecessor. If Mutharika’s 
presidency had centred on food security and corruption, the new president 
declared how the “main policy thrust of this Administration [will be] … 
transforming the structure of the economy in order to achieve economic growth, 
accelerated job creation and the protection of the vulnerable and the excluded.” 
To this end, Banda declared that she would pursue a “people’s development 
agenda that … overcomes poverty through its political, social and economic 
programs.” Banda in her address also made a populist appeal to the masses of 
whom she was purportedly a member: “As a Malawian woman who knows the 
humiliation of Malawian women; as a Malawian who has championed the plight 
of rural poor,” Banda announced that she would champion the causes of those 
Malawians who had fallen through the cracks under Mutharika.104 
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Banda, the development community’s 
“darling” 
 
Though the new president maintained that it was her enduring mission to 
support Malawi’s most marginalised groups, economic exigencies pulled Banda 
away from her self-prescribed duties to alleviate poverty and empower women. 
With the economy in a tailspin, Banda in her 2012 State of the Nation promised 
to devote urgent attention to the “foreign exchange shortage, tobacco industry 
crisis, fuel shortages, energy crisis, bad governance and poor human rights 
record, unemployment and diplomatic crisis among others.”105 The president 
proposed as part of her Short Term Economic Recovery Plan to “liberalise our 
currency and to restore our relations with the international community.” Just 
weeks into her presidency, Banda agreed to a package with the IMF and World 
Bank in which government would adopt a floating exchange rate and devalue 
the kwacha by 33 percent.106 Once the kwacha had been devalued, fuel, 
medicine, and electricity flowed back into the country. The new president also 
reversed several Mutharika-sponsored laws curtailing political freedoms, which 
prompted the return of budget support from the development partners.107 
Whereas Mutharika had shunned the IMF and other donors’ involvement in 
Malawian economic affairs in 2005 and 2011, Banda took an antithetical 
approach. For her conciliatory attitude toward Malawi’s development partners 
and for her progressive stance on women’s rights, Banda became something of 
a “development darling” in the international community.108 
 
While Banda insisted that structural adjustment was a necessary step, the on-
the-ground effects of devaluation clashed with the pro-poor brand she had 
brought to government. Devaluation had begotten massive inflation and soaring 
prices made many of the goods that poor Malawians rely on unaffordable. The 
price of maize, for instance, skyrocketed from US$7 per 50kg bag prior to May 
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2012 to nearly US$13 by the end of the year.109 The country’s smallholder 
farmers were not able to grow their way out of food insecurity that year with the 
World Food Programme reporting that by year’s end 1.63 million people (11% 
of the population) faced severe food shortages.110 Urban dwellers were also hard 
hit when fuel prices climbed 150 percent in a matter of months. Inflated prices 
moved civil servants to strike for higher wages until government agreed to 
salary increases of on average 19 percent.111 Disgruntled Malawians took to the 
streets in January and February 2013, protesting sustained high prices and what 
they perceived to be Banda’s careless concessions to the IMF. 
 
Banda strove to convince her constituents that her actions were necessary given 
the perilous state of the economy she had inherited from the previous 
government. The president noted in one interview how she had signs produced 
in every one of Malawi’s languages, explaining how she had needed to give the 
Malawian economy—which she analogised as a fever patient—an injection that 
would hurt initially but ultimately prove beneficial for the nation.112 But the 
president did not stop at rhetoric and took actions to demonstrate her sympathy 
with the suffering she saw Malawians facing: 
 
‘To get back on track, we needed to make some bold decisions … that 
resulted in some negative impact on the poor and therefore we had to 
come up with the social programmes that cushioned that shock. … 
Even if it costs me the next elections … all I wanted to do at the end 
of the day is to demonstrate to my fellow Malawians that I am 
prepared to suffer with them’.113 
 
To this end, Banda ordered the government to shed its fleet of Mercedes-Benz 
automobiles and she reduced her own salary by one-third. She also sold the 
airplane Mutharika had purchased, applying the US$15 million in proceeds to 
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purchase maize and farm inputs for vulnerable citizens.114 “I had to look at the 
situation of my fellow Malawians. If we are going to ask Malawians to make 
sacrifices, I must be the first to do it,” Banda noted. Paradoxically perhaps, it 
was the effects of Banda’s economic austerity policies that allowed the 
president to highlight further her compassion for poverty reduction. 
 
To demonstrate further her commitment to fixing the economy while also 
softening the blow from the effects of devaluation, Banda increased 
government’s investment in several donor-driven social protection 
programmes.115 “I asked them [the World Bank] to provide resources in order 
for us to implement public works programs, cash transfer programs, school 
feeding programs,” Banda noted, “to ensure that we take care of the shock of 
the devaluation.”116 Beginning in late 2012, the government scaled up the Public 
Works Programme (PWP), organised through MASAF, by US$2.5 million.117 
The Social Cash Transfer scheme, School Feeding programme, and FISP were 
also scaled up in conjunction with the passage of the National Social Support 
Policy in July 2012.118 Banda was apparently “very euphoric [sic] on how the 
social protection programme has … acted as a cushion against devaluation.”119 
She did not acknowledge however, as MP George Chaponda of the DPP pointed 
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out in one parliamentary debate, that without exception these programmes had 
been initiated under previous governments.120 
 
In addition to scaling up donor-funded programmes, Banda implemented 
through her presidential office a separate set of social protection initiatives that 
could supplement her “pro-poor” credentials, especially amongst women. 
“While I'm trying to bring the country back on track,” Banda explained, “I’m 
also very mindful of my mission—to make sure that I continue to empower 
women.… For me, that is what being a leader is all about.”121 Within one month 
of becoming president, Banda launched her Presidential Initiative on Maternal 
Health and Safe Motherhood that, among other ends, reduced childhood 
mortality by establishing “safe mother motherhood committees” that supported 
pregnant women and infants.122 In her third month as president, Banda launched 
the Presidential Initiative on Poverty and Hunger Reduction (PIPaHR), a 
poverty alleviation programme that principally targeted rural women.123 Banda 
announced in her May 2013 State of the Nation Address that PIPaHR had in the 






One PIPaHR programme that became strongly associated with the president 
ahead of the 2014 election was the Cow-a-Family programme. Announcing the 
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launch of the programme in the peri-urban township of Namitete outside the 
capital city Lilongwe, Banda declared once more her commitment to eradicating 
poverty and hunger as her “main priority” and articulated how she believed 
Cow-a-Family would help the country achieve that goal.125 “This [is] the time 
for poor families to own a dairy cow so that in the long run [they] can come out 
of poverty,” Banda declared. In what became a regular practice, Banda arranged 
for ceremonies to be held at which she would personally distribute livestock to 
beneficiaries.126 Cow-a-Family had reportedly distributed 756 dairy cows to 
citizens across 24 districts by the end of April 2014, and Banda announced her 
intention for the program to benefit 1.5 million Malawians over the next five 
years.127 Together with her government’s distribution of 8,680 goats and sheep 
through the parallel Small Stock Project, Banda insinuated her personal 
dedication to delivering basic livelihood-generating resources to the poorest 
citizens.128 
 
The president used Cow-a-Family moreover to emphasise her commitment to 
alleviating the plight of poor women in particular. Banda tasked prominent 
women including Dr. Susan Chikagwa-Malunga (an agricultural scientist) and 
Flora Kaluwile (an NGO management consultant) with coordinating the 
PIPaHR. Chikagwa-Malunga, who also oversaw the Small Stock project, noted 
how Banda’s programmes were “targeting communities and … vulnerable 
groups, particularly women who benefit through increased household 
incomes.”129 As the 2014 election approached, it was clear that Banda had 
cultivated a “pro-women” brand that no other candidate could match. Noted one 
observer, “A-cow-for-every family [programme] is effective with female voters 
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especially.… No one else is courting that half of the electorate.”130 Indeed, 
Banda touted the programme as a hallmark of her unparalleled dedication to 
poor Malawians. “I am especially talking about a cow per family initiative and 
Mudzi trust in which I am constructing houses for the poor: it is a known fact 
that anyone who will come after me will not continue these projects. So for the 




Mudzi Transformation Trust 
 
The Mudzi (Village) 
Transformation Trust (MTT) 
was another hallmark 
programme of Banda’s “people-
centred development agenda.” 
As a conclusion to her 2013 
State of the Nation, Banda 
announced that she would be 
launching MTT in response to 
the sustained level of national 
poverty that had been 
documented in the 2010/11 IHS. “Against this concern of deep levels of poverty 
… I have decided that for the first time, the Government will specifically target 
the individual villages across the country with comprehensive high impact 
interventions that will accelerate the betterment of well being of rural and urban 
poor,” Banda declared.132 Promising to “mobilise accessible, responsive and 
flexible resources to support social and economic projects for the transformation 
of the lives of Malawians,” the president called on the private sector to finance 
the MTT’s several development initiatives, which in practice became 
concentrated on building houses for the rural and peri-urban poor. While Banda 
often pitched Mudzi projects as the work of government, in reality the funding 
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for projects was sourced through party structures or the Joyce Banda 
Foundation.133 
 
Marketed nonetheless as a personal initiative of her presidential office, Banda 
devoted considerable energy and attention to her mission of advancing poverty 
alleviation through MTT. “As a mother,” the president explained, “it is my 
sincere wish that Malawians must have decent, adequate and affordable 
accommodation. ... That is why I have established the Mudzi Transformation 
Trust to make sure that our development is inclusive with shared prosperity.”134 
To this end, Banda travelled to the United Nations in September 2013 with a 
delegation featuring “ordinary villagers and the Chairperson of the Mudzi 
Transformation Trust” to lobby development partner to assist her in financing 
the programme.135 Upon her return, Banda was documented on several 
occasions presenting “Mudzi houses” directly to constituents.136 Referencing 
her mission to ensure a social floor for all Malawians, Banda referred to MTT 
as “a dream, and the dream is now a reality, and I am happy as a leader that 
people can now live in a decent home.”137 
 
By the end of 2013, MTT had delivered 500 houses and roughly US$2.5 million 
in total spending toward associated projects in both rural and urban areas.138 As 
one traditional authority in the northern Mzimba District articulated after Banda 
led a Mudzi ceremony in his district, “I am tongued [sic] tied. We have never 
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dreamt that some of our people would have decent houses and have access to 
clean portable [sic] water. This is a dream.”139 It was, this tribal authority noted 
moreover, because of MTT that he believed for the first time that government 
cared for all of its citizens. Active in more than just rural areas however, the 
president strove to reach poor Malawians in urban areas as well. “Some people 
wrongly think it is only people in rural areas; in the villages that are living in 
abject poverty,” the president remarked at one Mudzi ceremony. “No; it’s not 
only them because people in townships like in Ndirande here are worse off, 
too.”140 It seemed that wherever she went, Banda’s implied that it was only her 
government that could ensure citizens’ basic needs would be met. 
 
Despite positive regard for Banda amongst her programme’s beneficiaries, 
many Malawians slammed the president for her “handout” programmes. 
Government Platform, a consortium of domestic civil society organisations, 
called the “Mudzi Transformation Trust and one family one cow … not only 
suspicious but also not … worthy investing in though [they are] politically 
popular.”141 The organisation further declared that Malawi needs “choices and 
decisions that transcend political considerations.” Ephraim Munthali, a 
prominent journalist, in an article questioned wherein MTT operated; as “a 
public body or a charity organisation that will operate outside the country’s 
systems?”142 He also questioned Banda’s decision to implement a programme 
that in its characteristics matched the government’s longstanding Local 
Development Fund, the implementation arm of MASAF, and pointed out how 
the president had tasked traditional authorities and not bureaucrats to select 
programme beneficiaries.143 Academic observer Ernest Thindwa articulated a 
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common observation that Banda’s ceremonies were more about cultivating her 
brand than truly about poverty alleviation. “This [the size of Banda’s entourage] 
gives an impression that the government has a lot of money,” Thindwa noted.144 
“In my view the president is just trying to popularise herself [through the 
entourages and the branding of the items].” Indeed, in some cases bags of maize 
were stamped “Joyce Banda.”145 Banda’s tactics also made waves in parliament 
where the DPP’s Chaponda commented on the floor that “the President’s cost of 
travel alone … to distribute one cow per household costs the taxpayer K12 
million [US$30,000], per day. This excludes the cost of the cow.”146 
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Instead of disavowing these 
characterisations however, 
Banda embraced the notion that 
she was the only leader willing 
to ensure that Malawians’ basic 
needs were being met. Vowing 
to continue her pro-poor 
initiatives, Banda claimed that 
“even in Western countries there 
are ultra-poor people who 
survive on handouts” and 
promised that if elected she 
would “continue to give help to those in need.”147 Nor did she disavow any 
criticisms that it was she and the PP rather than the government that was 
pursuing poverty alleviation. “I want all of you to know,” she proclaimed at a 
November 2012 food distribution event, “that I will continue distributing maize 
to the needy people of this country. There is no way I can stand by and drink tea 
when people are suffering, so I will not tire, myself and various members of the 
People’s Party will continue to distribute maize where it is needed most.”148 
Images of Banda personally delivering bags of maize, dancing with rural 
women, and sitting with elderly villagers—reifying her effusive rhetoric around 
poverty reduction—percolated through the media in the weeks leading up to the 
election.149 Everywhere Banda went around the country, the PP’s open lock and 
key logo was present. This symbol, which adorned PIPaHR maize bags and 
Mudzi houses, reinforced the president’s mission, as she articulated in her 2013 
State of the Nation, to “unlock the potential of the Malawian people to regain 
their freedom, dignity and sense of pride.”150  
 
With ambitions for a full term but just twenty-five months in office before the 
2014 election, Banda toured the country, touting her record on poverty 
alleviation. At several “development rallies” where she would distribute “maize, 
livestock, houses for the poor and elderly and even motorbikes to the youth” 
(Dulani and Dionne, 2014), Banda furthered the notion that she would be the 
champion of poor Malawians:151 
 
                                                
147 “JB Vows to Continue pro-Poor Initiative.” 
148 “JB Takes Food Distribution Exercise to Mangochi.” 
149 Madam President. 
150 State of the Nation Address, 2013 
151 Boniface Dulani and Kim Yi Dionne, “Presidential, Parliamentary, and Local Government 
Elections in Malawi, May 2014,” Electoral Studies 36 (December 2014): 219, 
doi:10.1016/j.electstud.2014.08.005. 
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‘I have built houses for the needy … [and] we have distributed several 
cows to the poor. We have done such projects and several others for 
the benefit of Malawians. … I will continue to build houses for the 
poor. I will continue to distribute cows for families and in particular 
to help the poor people of this country.… My fellow Malawians you 
know what I have done for this country. I have come to ask for your 
vote. If you want the programmes we have been doing for the people 
of Malawi like the ones I have mentioned to continue, vote for me’.152 
 
Though her tactics may have 
elicited contentious public views of 
her leadership style, Banda’s 
spearheading of several initiatives 
through her presidential office—to 
which she could claim personal 
credit—furthered the associations 
between the president and her pro-
poor programmes. “The president 
loves handouts,” noted one 
observer. “She says she’s a charitable president and would like to give to people 
to alleviate their poverty. … She’s been distributing cows, goats, shoes …”153 
This public commitment to charity was what Banda hoped would carry her to 





As had been the case during the early part of Mutharika’s term, Banda pursued 
poverty alleviation through programmes that she hoped would earn her the 
support of a national electorate. However, she faced considerable governance 
challenges. Though Banda managed by February 2013 to recruit 77 MPs (40% 
of members) to the PP’s caucus in parliament, the president lacked an 
established grassroots network and a reliable bureaucracy that could implement 
a wide-scale poverty alleviation programme.154 Her response to these conditions 
                                                
152 “JB Increasingly Upbeat to Win Malawi Elections,” Malawi Nyasa Times - Malawi 
Breaking News in Malawi, accessed March 18, 2015, 
http://www.nyasatimes.com/2014/05/11/jb-increasingly-upbeat-to-win-malawi-elections/. 
153 Interview with Henry Chingaipe, Director, Institute for Policy Research & Social 
Empowerment 
154 Many in the PP camp defected (back) to other parties during the “Cashgate” scandal that 
emerged in September of 2013. For more information about the practice of party-switching in 
 38 
was to pursue various “handout” programmes through which she could 
personally demonstrate her commitment to poverty reduction. The fact also that 
Banda had acceded to the donor agenda, whereas Mutharika had emphatically 
rejected it, contrasted her brand from that of her controversial predecessor. 
 
For their parts, the major opposition parties were all outspoken in opposition to 
these handout programmes and insisted that economic growth was the only way 
to achieve poverty alleviation.155 The president’s fiercest critic was probably the 
MCP’s Lazarus Chakwera, a reverend in the Assemblies of God church and a 
newcomer to national politics. In his letter opening the MCP election manifesto 
(“Nothing for Us, Without Us”), Chakwera harangued “personalized politics” 
and “a dependency syndrome which unfortunately is being exploited by the 
leaders to gain political popularity through handouts.”156 In one stump speech, 
Chakwera characterised Banda’s programmes as actually increasing poverty, 
though they were ostensibly dedicated to reducing it. “Malawians are poor not 
just because of God’s will but … due to the spirit of hand-outs which has grown 
roots among Malawians,” Chakwera declared.157 “No country in the world can 
develop through the spirit of giving its citizens Cows, Houses and any other 
Materials, but [rather by] teaching people to work hard.”158 Though the MCP 
manifesto lacked mention of a specific poverty reduction strategy beyond 
increasing macroeconomic growth, Chakwera in one speech called for 
“programmes beneficial to Malawians and not mere distribution of cattle,” an 
implicit criticism of the Cow-a-Family programme.159 On Election Day, 
Chakwera beseeched prospective voters to “vote for me … not because I am 
                                                                                                                                                  
Malawi, see Daniel J. Young, “An Initial Look into Party Switching in Africa: Evidence from 
Malawi,” Party Politics 20, no. 1 (2014): 105–15. 
155 According to Chunga (2014), the structure of the MCP manifestos has remained 
unchanged through the years from 1999 to 2009, and neither does the 2014 manifesto does 
not deviate much from this mould. One theme that transcends all of the manifestos is the 
party’s desire to demonstrate its qualification to lead on the basis of having been “the Party 
which liberated every Malawian from the colonial bondage and brought Independence and 
human dignity to Malawi.” Chunga, “Examining the Relevance of Political Parties in 
Malawi,” 12; MCP Election Manifesto, 2014. 
156 MCP Election Manifesto, 2014. Emphasis is original. 
157 “Southern Region Shuns MCP Once More, As Chakwera Scorns JB’s One Cow Per 




159 “Chakwera Attacks JB on Hand-Outs in Zomba,” Malawi Nyasa Times - Malawi Breaking 
News in Malawi, accessed March 19, 2015, 
http://www.nyasatimes.com/2014/05/08/chakwera-attacks-jb-on-hand-outs-in-zomba/. 
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giving you handouts in this campaign but because you desire to see change of 
things in a Malawi to come.”160 
 
Peter Mutharika’s campaign theme, in the words of his brother’s former legal 
counsel Z. Allan Ntata, was to “‘continue from where my brother left off.’”161 
DPP party leaders clearly sought to continue the party’s Bingu-era food 
production branding, adding to their party regalia portraits of Bingu alongside 
the maize cob motif. To this end moreover, the DPP offered to double down on 
the successes of FISP, proposing to “make subsidized fertilizer available for 
every maize subsistence farmer that [sic] needs it.”162 Subsidies were still 
needed, the newcomer Mutharika explained, “so that every Malawian can afford 
the means to produce food while earning the dignity of labouring to feed 
[themselves].”163 Resonant with Minister Gondwe’s 2007-2008 Budget 
Address, the DPP in its manifesto enunciated further its collective vision to 
transform Malawi “from being a predominantly importing and consuming 
country to a predominantly producing and exporting country; and a food-
sufficient country where hunger is eliminated.”164 Not only would the nation’s 
farmers experience food security with the DPP in government, the party’s 
branding suggested, but Malawians would be able to achieve that food security 
by their own efforts. Gondwe also distinguished between what he believed the 
DPP and PP, respectively, would offer the country. “We [the DPP] will 
subsidize the price of … cement and empower Malawians to build what they 
want by themselves,” he noted, “not apa mbofyo, apa mbofyo! (Here a small 
unplanned house, there another house).”165 The manifesto also included a 
promise that a DPP government would pass a Law on Handouts in order to 
“phase out the spirit of dependency.” 
 
As the election approached, Banda attempted to keep the public’s attention on 
her ambitions to reduce poverty. The PP manifesto (“Transforming Malawi 
Together”) in its first chapter trumpets the president’s successes in 
“modernizing rural areas and fighting poverty” through MTT. “In the short time 
                                                
160 “Chakwera Bemoans Handouts,” Afriem.org, accessed March 23, 2015, 
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162 DPP Election Manifesto, 2014. Emphasis is original. 
163 “Mutharika Wants Feedback on Proposals to Tackle Malawi ‘intellectual Crisis,’” Malawi 
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I have been President,” Banda penned in a letter opening the manifesto, “we 
have taken decisive action to recover the economy, build a foundation for 
growth and deal with corruption…. I am committed to continue to champion the 
cause of the rural and urban poor.” 
 
Yet new crises emerged during the final quarter of Banda’s term that distracted 
the general public from the poverty-oriented brand she had striven to project. 
Most notably, in September 2013 it was revealed that a number of civil servants 
had stolen about US$30 million from government coffers. In response, donors 
withheld about US$150 million in budgetary support from the government.166 
“Cashgate,” as the scandal came to be known, included the mysterious shooting 
of a senior budget official and the arrest of more than 60 government officials 
including senior ministers in the Banda government. Though never legally 
implicated in a scandal that likely predated her presidency, Banda received 
harsh criticism in the media for her handling of Cashgate.167 In addition to 
Cashgate, the return of drought in the last quarter of 2013 left 1.46 million 
people (9.5% of the population) unable to meet their annual food requirements 
and caused the price of maize to climb from US$0.37 to US$0.60 per kg in 
January 2014.168 Both of these issues presented major public relations stumbling 
blocks for a president who sought to portray herself as being sympathetic to the 
plight of the poor. 
 
With scandals swirling and the economy 
stuttering, Banda won 20 percent of the vote, 
failing to win the election and the pan-regional 
mandate she had no doubt endeavoured to earn. 
Peter Mutharika won the election with just 36.4 
percent of the vote, winning majorities in only 
Southern districts in which fellow Lomwes 
predominate. In this way, the outcome mirrored 
Malawi’s election results prior to 2009. 
However, a deeper investigation of the election  
outcome reveals a twist. Without winning a 
majority of any Northern or Central district, 
Mutharika nonetheless placed second in both of those regions, suggesting how 
residual support for Bingu and/or the party’s food production branding may 
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have buoyed support for the DPP in those regions.169 In other ways too the 2014 
outcome reflected the multifaceted concerns of the Malawian electorate. 
Chakwera won only (and all) Central districts, thanks to the support of fellow 
Chewas, while Atupele Muluzi, son of the former president, earned pluralities in 
south-eastern districts where fellow Yao Muslims predominate. Banda, though 
she comes from the Central region, won pluralities in every Northern district. 
Though her husband’s ethnic Tonga and northerner identity may have 
augmented her support there, the fact that the Northern region lacked strong 
partisan ties after the collapse of AFORD in 2009 suggests alternatively how a 
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While the data presented in this branding analysis cannot explain the 
motivations of the marginal voter in 2014, it seems likely that salient issues as 
well as ethno-regional ties are both, to variable degrees, potential determinants 
of election outcomes. This was also the conclusion of Brazys et al. (2015) who 
commented on how “ethnicity is a fluid ascription [that] can fluctuate as other 
factors become more or less salient.”171 Going forward therefore, the political 
window of opportunity for new pro-poor champions to win a pan-regional 
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Regardless of whether candidates are in fact able to earn a national support base 
in a particular election however, it is clear that Malawi’s recent presidential 
incumbents have operated under the belief that they can achieve national 
consensus around their respective political brands. As Banda noted—perhaps 
mistakenly—in a 2014 interview, “I thank God—in some places, elections go 
on tribal lines. In Malawi we have gone beyond that.”172 Indeed, for Banda and 
Mutharika, neither of whom had established patronage networks initially, 
governing in a fashion that could earn them national appeal was a political 
necessity. To this end, both candidates branded themselves in ways that they 
hoped would resonate with a broader base of voters—food production in 
Mutharika’s case and basic social protection coverage for more marginalised 
groups in Banda’s case. This analysis ultimately supports the findings of van 
Donge (1995) who argued that candidates in Malawi have, despite the 
undercurrent of patronage politics, attempted “to portray themselves as [being] 
of much wider significance.” 
 
Furthermore, candidate and party branding can be understood not as a series of 
discrete events, but rather as a continuum of branding and counter-branding 
exercises in response to perceived gaps in the electoral space. Muluzi and 
Mutharika both cultivated brands suggesting how they would emphasise food 
security, yet it was the latter’s decision to defy the demands of Malawi’s 
development partners in implementing AISP that set the Mutharika/DPP brand 
apart. The brand thereafter became not just about ensuring food security but 
about empowering farmers to the point at which they could graduate from 
smallholder status and the country from dependency. To this end, Mutharika 
demanded donor disengagement from Malawi’s economic affairs, though it was 
this aspect of his brand that ultimately put the country on a path to financial ruin 
and deepening poverty. Joyce Banda, even before taking office, branded herself 
as a president who would take the country in the opposite direction. Mutharika 
spurned the donors; Banda embraced them. Mutharika championed able-bodied 
workers; Banda championed women and other marginalised Malawians for 
whom export-driven growth had not been inclusive. In the 2014 election, the 
challengers Chakwera and Peter Mutharika reacted to Banda’s “maternal” brand 
by advocating labour-based empowerment as a means to achieving poverty 
alleviation. 
 
Though this analysis elucidates how Malawian political elites engage in 
political branding, it does little to clarify the relative favourability of different 
poverty brands to voters. Secondary literature on attitudes toward poverty 
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reduction instruments in Malawi and across the region offer some important 
insights, however. There is an enduring belief throughout much of the 
developing world, Ward (1999) argued, that poor people are poor simply 
because they are unwilling to work.173 For many citizens therefore, poverty 
eradication programmes that promote personal initiative are preferred to 
programmes that deliver benefits directly.174 The analysis of Kalebe-Nyamongo 
and Marquette (2014) supported this observation. Among Malawian political 
elites, “there is preference for productive forms of social protection, such as 
input subsidies or public works that support the ‘active’ poor, and policy 
strategies that enable the poor to become economically active.”175 In agrarian 
Malawi, non-elite attitudes toward poverty and work suggest too that farm 
subsidies are an ideal mechanism for poverty alleviation. Dorward et al. (2009) 
noted how a pilot programme that delivered an input package to smallholder 
farmers was received with a high level of satisfaction among 86 percent of 
participants and “was more popular … than food or cash for work.”176 
 
These commonplace attitudes toward the poor and anti-poverty instruments 
suggest that politicians who brand themselves as being supportive of farm 
subsidies stand a greater chance of appealing to the electorate. This suggests 
further that Banda was misguided in her belief that a focus on direct transfers 
(“handouts”) would endear her to poor voters. Indeed, the fact that Malawians 
seem to favour labour-based solutions to poverty rather than transfer-based 
solutions implies that a Chakwera-MCP or Mutharika-DPP brand would be 
received more favourably than the Banda-PP brand. Yet relative favourability of 
poverty brands does not add insight about whether these brands were even at all 
salient to voters in 2009 and 2014. Absent public opinion data on the salience of 
election issues in Malawi, data from the Afrobarometer-Malawi survey could 
provide some insights into the relative salience of candidates’ poverty-centred 
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As the prior section has evidenced, Malawian presidential candidates have 
responded to the heightened political competition through the development of 
political messaging centred on poverty eradication. To understand the possible 
effects that such branding exercise have in changing voting behaviour however, 
it first becomes necessary to know what salience particular societal issues have 
amongst voters. In this regard, public opinion data from the Afrobarometer-
Malawi (AB) survey can offer some insights into what issues were salient to 
voters ahead of a given election. 
 
The hypothesis is that if a particular issue (e.g., food security) is salient to 
voters, then a candidate’s public commitment to resolving that issue (i.e., 
his/her brand) will be influential—relative to branding around other issues—in 
shaping voting behaviour. By contrast, if a particular election issue is not salient 
to voters, then branding around that issue will not be influential in shaping 
voting behaviour. In Malawi, the issues to which survey respondents have 
expressed concern are numerous, but they tend to centre on management of the 
economy, food security, corruption, and public health. Depending on the 
relative importance of these issues to voters, particular issue brands may or may 
not resonate with voters’ concerns. If the issues around which candidates 
cultivate brands are not the crux of voters’ concerns in fact, but rather are 
secondary to other factors such as candidate ethno-regional identity, then 




What issues do Malawians care about? The 
Bingu wa Mutharika era 
 
For a plurality of Malawians, “Food shortage/famine” has consistently been the 
most important societal challenge that government should address (see below). 
This is not surprising given how Malawi is an overwhelmingly agrarian society 
in which many millions of subsistence farmers survive under conditions of 
heightened vulnerability. Concerns about food insecurity have always been 
relatively high during the period, according to the data, but the significant 
variation over time can likely be attributed to the efforts of government to 
assuage food-related crises. In 2000, when the first AB survey was recorded, the 
UDF government of President Bakili Muluzi had implemented the Starter Pack 
Scheme (SPS). The SPS considerably increased the availability of food in 
Malawi and can be identified as the reason for why only 15 percent of 
respondents (18 percent of rural respondents) believed that “Food 
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shortage/famine” was the most important issue that government should address. 
However, the IMF and USAID successfully lobbied government to scale-down 
SPS in favour of the more narrowly-targeted Targeted Input Programme (TIP), 
which has been attributed to exacerbation of the effects of the drought that hit 
the country in 2001-2002. As a likely consequence, the percentage of 
Malawians in 2003 identifying food shortages as the most important problem 



































































During the first Mutharika term (2004-2009), the correlation strengthened 





























































respondent concerns about food shortage. In 2005, a year when only 37 percent 
of Malawians were able to meet their food requirements due to severe drought, 
nearly half of respondents noted how food shortage was the concern that 
government should prioritise. In addition, “Farming/agriculture” was chosen by 
the next largest grouping (12%). No other option was chosen by more than 4 
percent of respondents. By the year of the next AB survey (2008), government 
fertiliser subsidies disseminated through AISP had catalysed substantial 
increases to maize production in the country, with the quantity nearly tripling 
over the course of two growing seasons. Though concerns about food remained 
high, the fact that food availability had increased markedly was without doubt 
the principal cause for the decline in food shortage concerns among rural 
respondents, from 50 percent in 2005 to 21 percent by 2012.  
 
The Mutharika government’s efforts to address food insecurity through 
agricultural productivity translated to considerable improvements in public 
favourability toward the government and president, according to the data. 
Drought in the early to mid-2000s had resulted in relatively severe food 
shortages. Though a spike in food aid from the World Food Programme to 
Malawi had undoubtedly assuaged some hunger, only 20 percent of AB 
respondents in 2005 said that the government was ensuring everyone had 
enough food to eat. After fertiliser subsidies had massively increased crop 
yields, the percentage who said government was in fact ensuring people had 
enough to eat rose to 53 percent. Critically, this was the only recorded moment 
in the period when a majority of respondents said government was succeeding 
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On price stability, which was also an important concern of poor rural 
Malawians who rely on purchased maize for part of the year, Mutharika’s 
government improved its standing with respondents. During the early decade, 
national crop shortages caused principally by reductions to state-delivered 
fertiliser subsidies through SPS had resulted in high maize prices. Accordingly, 
only 12 and 17 percent of respondents in 2003 and 2005, respectively, indicated 
that government was doing a satisfactory job keeping prices stable or holding 
them down. That percentage virtually doubled to 33 percent in 2008, a rate that 
was sustained in 2012. Though respondents were still on the whole 
disapproving of government’s price control efforts, they were more approving 




Presidential approval and the 2009 election 
 
The emphasis that Mutharika placed on food production especially after 2005 
was very likely to have been a factor in boosting his presidential approval 
rating. One year into the president’s first term, a middling 56 percent of AB 
respondents believed that Mutharika had performed his job well over the prior 
twelve months. By 2008, the president’s approval rating among AB respondents 
had climbed to 83 percent. Given the large percentage of Malawians who in 
2005 had identified “Food shortage/famine” as the most important issue that 
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principally concerned with food production set him up for considerable popular 
approbation. Having addressed in a profound way an issue that a large 
proportion of Malawians consider to be of paramount importance (“Food 
shortage/famine”), Mutharika’s political stock rose dramatically. When 
respondents were asked in 2008 which party they would vote for in an election, 
60 percent said they would vote for the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP). In 
the following year’s presidential election, Mutharika got the support of 66 
percent of voters (see below).177 
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values partially explain discrepancies between how respondents said they would vote and 
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Following the 2009 election, Mutharika experienced a significant decline in 
public approval rating from 83 percent to 60 percent among AB respondents. 
With the government having addressed during the late 2000s to a considerable 
degree the country’s food insecurity concerns, Malawians’ concerns had shifted 
considerably by the beginning of the 2010s. Proper management of the 
economy had become by 2012 a topmost concern for nearly as many people 
(18%) as those who indicated that food shortage was their top concern (20%). 
There were, indeed, reasons for Malawians to be concerned with the state of the 
economy. Mutharika’s inability to bring foreign exchange into the country 
drastically reduced critical imports including fuel and medicine, causing the 
national economy essentially to grind to a halt. As a likely consequence, 
economic management had become the most important problem for government 
to address for urban Malawians especially. 
 
 
The institutionalisation of subsidies 
 
By the time Joyce Banda became president in April 2012, a “Green Revolution” 
had eliminated the food security concerns that Malawians had experienced in 
the mid-2000s. After years of stunted yields due to a lack of soil nitrogen 
concentration, Mutharika’s fertiliser subsidies had allowed most farmers to 
produce enough of a crop to at least meet their basic food requirements, and 
allowed many others to become net sellers of maize. This economic transition 
undoubtedly reduced food shortage concerns around the country, as reflected in 
the fact that by 2012 only 20 percent of AB respondents listed food shortages as 
an issue of foremost societal concern. With the destructive effects of drought 
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was perhaps no longer as politically potent by 2012 as it had been in the mid-
2000s. 
 
Moreover, while Mutharika had taken a political gamble in offering fertiliser 
subsidies on the scale and scope that AISP in 2005, by 2012 their provision had 
become politically sacrosanct. The president had initially stood alone in 
supporting fertiliser subsidies while both opposition political parties and the 
donor community criticised his aggressive agenda. Mutharika had thus striven 
to market the DPP as the party that would champion the food security issue for 
smallholders. The salience of that issue at the time is what allowed the president 
to leverage his brand into a 2009 election victory that featured pan-regional 
support. Since the election of 2009 however, no national politician has 
suggested publicly that fertiliser subsidies be withdrawn, though there has been 
ample debate about reforms relating to its implementation. The fact that 
political elites have reached consensus on the notion that government should 
provide subsidies has therefore had the effect of depoliticising the issue. 
 
By 2012 consequently, the potency of branding around subsidies had 
diminished for two reasons. First, a consistently higher crop yield nationwide 
than what the country had produced in 2005 meant that food sufficiency was 
more commonplace than it had been. Second, with subsidies continuing after 
Mutharika’s death as an institutionalised offering of government, discussion of 
food security had become an essential aspect of all parties’ manifestos. 
Cultivating a related political brand therefore was not likely to have been as 
beneficial for presidential candidates in 2014 as it had been during the 2000s. 
 
 
Joyce Banda: emphasising poverty and 
economic reform 
 
Southern Africa’s first female president rode into office on a wave of hope and 
optimism following the death of a president whose mismanagement of the 
economy and autocratic tendencies had contributed to general frustration and 
angst. In an April 2012 opinion piece, Mwangi Kimenyi described how Banda 
against this backdrop was “a sign of hope” and prompted Malawians to “talk of 
a better future.”178 Accordingly, Banda entered office with the enthusiasm of a 
frustrated people behind her. When the Round 5 AB survey was recorded in 
June 2012, Banda enjoyed a presidential approval rating of 68 percent (see 
above). The People’s Party (PP) too, which she had founded in September 2011 
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in anticipation of contesting the May 2014 election, also received high praise 
from AB respondents in 2012. When asked which party they would vote for if 
an election were held tomorrow, 46 percent of respondents reported they would 
vote for PP, compared to 16 percent for the formerly ruling DPP.179 This high 
level of approbation would be short-lived, however, as Banda’s popularity 
declined precipitously since the mid-2012 poll was taken. 
 
The Banda presidency, though it lasted less than half of a full presidential term, 
was characterised in its public emphasis by a complex set of policy priorities. 
On the one hand, Banda strove to portray herself as a leader who would 
champion the welfare of Malawians who had not benefitted from the country’s 
economic growth and had suffered under its recent decline. This was Banda’s 
“social brand.” Among other pursuits, she lobbied for greater women’s rights, 
advocated maternal and children’s health, and lobbied for an expanded public 
recognition of women’s roles in all economic and social spheres generally. This 
self-portrayal was shaped in part by her pre-political career as an activist and 
social progressive. Though pursuing these objectives was her ostensible 
“mission,” Banda at the same time followed a reconciliatory approach with the 
donor community and pursued a reformist economic agenda. This was her 
“economic brand.” Her immediate outreach to donors for collaboration in 
Malawi’s national development placed her in stark contrast to Mutharika who 
had repeatedly spurned the IMF on several occasions when they insisted on 
structural adjustment. In an effort to “counterbrand” against her predecessor, 
Banda emphasised in several interviews how in her early presidency she had to 
“clean up the mess that I have found” (March 2013) left by the previous 
administration.180  
 
These public priorities of the Banda government can thus be summarised as 
addressing the societal problems (listed in the AB survey) of 
“Poverty/destitution,” “Management of the economy,” “Health,” 
“Discrimination/inequality,” “Gender issues/women’s rights,” and “Violence 
against women.” Among these several problems to which she had committed 
solving, the one that had the greatest salience to urban voters was management 
of the economy. With 30 percent of urban respondents in 2012 reporting that 
government should prioritise fixing the economy, the fact that Banda had 
promised to urgently address the 2011-2012 foreign exchange crisis set her up 
                                                
179 In the 2012 AB survey, 6 percent of respondents refused to divulge which party they 
would vote for; 10 percent said they did not know; 6 percent said they would not vote. 
180 “Malawi Leader Defends China Links, Tells the West: ‘Don’t Tell Us What to Do’,” 




to win over a considerable percentage of the urban electorate.181 But after 
devaluing the kwacha and implementing a government austerity plan, services 
were cut and prices remained high. Though Banda and the development partners 
had expected a faster rate of economic recovery, the expected growth rate did 
not return. In response, observers commented on how the IMF-supported 
structural adjustment programme may not have had achieved the promise of 
economic improvement that the reformers had expected it to. As development 
economist Thandika Mkandawire commented in the midst of the turmoil in 
2013 for instance, “The social consequences of the [adjustment] policies are 
dire.”182 
 
By 2014, many urban Malawians undoubtedly felt betrayed that the president 
had not followed through on her statements surrounding economic reform. 
Whereas 52 percent of respondents in 2012 had indicated the early PP 
government was managing the economy well, by 2014 only 28 percent said so. 
Survey-takers in 2014 also believed other parties could do a better job of 
managing the economy. Just 12 percent of urban respondents believed the PP 
was the party most likely to manage the economy well. This suggests how 
Banda’s economic reformist branding effort did not convince many prospective 
voters that her party’s approach offered improvements over what other parties 
would do. In fact, 33 percent of urban respondents believed that the DPP would 
                                                
181 The president declared in her first State of the Nation Address how she would prioritise 
economic reforms. 
182 Elliot Ross, “Joyce Banda Has Bigger Problems than Madonna,” Africa Is a Country, 
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be most able among all parties to manage the economy. A greater percentage of 
urban respondents, moreover, selected the MCP (21%) and UDF (13%) than did 
the ruling party. 
 
Another prominent aspect of the Banda brand was her advocacy for the poor. 
Banda since her days as vice-president had marketed the PP among Malawi’s 
political parties as being uniquely “pro-poor.” To substantiate her claims to 
being the candidate most committed to alleviating poverty, Banda pursued 
personalised programmes through her presidential office that targeted poor 
women and other marginalised groups. Her efforts may have somewhat 
increased support for her candidacy in 2014—7 percent of AB respondents 
identified “Poverty/destitution” as the most important issue for government to 
address. But most Malawians it seems did not feel Banda’s modus operandi 
would best contribute to poverty eradication. When asked in 2014 which party 
would be most likely to improve living standards of the poor, 29 percent of 
respondents identified the DPP, whereas 22 percent identified the PP. This 
finding suggests that while Banda’s “handout” campaigns including PIPaHR 
and Mudzi Transformation Trust may have found favour with recipients, they 
did not reflect back onto a “pro-poor” image for the president, at least among 
most prospective voters. Whereas 49 percent of respondents in 2012 who 
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standards of the poor indicated their approval for her government, by 2014 that 
percentage had fallen to less than 40 percent in this regard. 
 
On food and other issues related to farming, which was listed as being of 
foremost importance to a combined 29 percent of respondents in 2012, the PP 
did not offer much that could distinguish it from the other parties. The PP was 
not strongly branded around these issues, and Banda for the most part opted to 
continue the policy infrastructure that had been left her by the previous 
administration. The one programmatic exception to this continuation was 
Banda’s (prospective) implementation of the Farm Input Loan Programme 
(FILP). FILP, which the government rolled out in November 2013 as a parallel 
programme to FISP, was ostensibly to address some of the procedural snafus 
that arose from the distribution of fertiliser vouchers. The true principal purpose 
of the programme may have been different, however. As Brazys et al. (2015) 
noted, Banda had “built [FILP] around her and poorer districts” in an effort to 
cultivate a more pro-poor image of her candidacy.183 FILP however had a 
limited impact as the government introduced the programme only about six 
months before the 2014 election. 
 
The president’s relative “non-focus” on food security likely diminished the 
public’s confidence that she and the PP could ensure food availability, 
especially during times of increased need. At the three-month mark of her 
presidency, 53 percent of AB respondents who gave an opinion said that the PP 
government was doing well in ensuring that everyone had enough food to eat, as 
compared to 47 percent who said it was doing badly.184 By 2014, respondents 
had considerably soured on the Banda government: 39 percent said her 
government was doing well and 61 percent said it was doing badly.185 More 
telling perhaps was the fact that only 20 percent of respondents in 2014 believed 
the PP was the political party most likely to ensure everyone has enough to 
eat.186 With a minor drought in 2012-2013 having increased angst around food 
availability, Banda’s government responded with direct food aid. But as 
resounding support for Mutharika and AISP had revealed, Malawians have a 
strong preference for being able to grow their own food. The PP government’s 
inability to respond in a similar fashion to how Mutharika had responded to 
drought in 2005 almost certainly hurt her stock with poor rural farmers who 
                                                
183 Samuel Brazys, Peter Heaney, and Patrick P. Walsh, “From the Great Lakes to the Great 
Rift Valley: Does Strategic Economic Policy Explain the 2009 Malawi Election?” Working 
Paper (University College Dublin. Geary Institute, 2014), 51, 
http://researchrepository.ucd.ie/handle/10197/5612. 
184 In response to the question, 20 percent of respondents said they “Don’t know.” 
185 In response to the question, 2 percent of respondents said they “Don’t know.” 
186 In response to the question, 33 percent of respondents said DPP; 21 percent said MCP; 11 
percent said UDF; 14 percent said None or “Don’t know/Haven’t heard.” 
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were the ones most likely to identify food shortages as being the societal 
problem that government should address. 
 
A still-sputtering economy, high maize prices, and a national scandal in 
“Cashgate” were all likely reasons for why Banda’s reputation among 
Malawians plummeted in a matter of twenty-two months. Among those 
respondents in 2012 who offered an opinion on Banda’s presidency, 76 percent 
had favoured the president. In 2014, that rate had fallen to 39 percent. Banda’s 
diminished approval rating among survey respondents reflected also a decline in 
support for the ruling party. The 46 percent of respondents who had identified 
the PP as the party they would choose in an election had fallen in 2014 to 19 
percent, 8 points lower than the DPP and 2 points lower than the MCP. The 
actual presidential election which followed the AB poll by less than two months 




Banda and peri-urban respondents 
 
One curiosity of the AB survey data is that peri-urban respondents evaluated 
Banda and the PP more favourably than rural or urban Malawians across several 
metrics.187 For instance, half of peri-urban respondents in 2014 indicated that 
the government was doing a satisfactory job ensuring that everyone has enough 
to eat, 
compar









                                                
187 The Round 5 (2012) survey includes three inhabitancy classifications: ‘Cities,’ ‘Rural,’ 
and a third category that is referred to interchangeably as ‘Towns’ and ‘Peri-urban.’ The 
latter is defined in the survey’s explanation of variables as “towns and Bomas [sprawl around 
district capitals].” Respondents in this third category were estimated to be 7 percent of the 
population. In the Round 6 (2014) survey, only the term ‘Peri-urban’ is used, though it is not 
further defined. This population was estimated to be 3 percent of the population. This study 
makes the assumption that these categories in 2012 and 2014 are the same. There is no 
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The rate of approval had in fact increased since Banda had come into office. 
Likewise, 54 percent of peri-urban residents in 2014 approved of how 
government was improving living standards for the poor, compared to 47 of 
urban and 37 percent of rural respondents. 
 
 
Increases to approval for the government’s handling of various societal issues 
were moreover correlated with approval for the party among peri-urban 
Malawians. When asked to indicate which party they believed would be the 
most likely to achieve six different outcomes, peri-urban respondents in 2014 
selected the PP-Banda at a rate between 6 and 11 points higher than the group 
that was next-most favourable to the PP. For example, 28 percent of peri-urban 
respondents selected the PP as the party most likely to ensure people have 
enough food to eat. These respondents also indicated how they believed the PP 
would be best able to manage the economy (27%) and improve the living 
standards of the poor (33%). A much greater proportion of peri-urban 
respondents stated that the ruling party would control prices (60%) than did 
respondents as a whole (46%). When asked for which party they would vote in 
an election, a plurality of peri-urban respondents chose the PP (27%) whereas 
respondents as a total bloc chose the DPP (19%). Higher support for the PP and 
government was also correlated with higher relative support for the president 
among peri-urban residents, though support for her presidency on the whole did 
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among peri-urban residents well exceeded the 38-percent rating that she had 
across all respondent groups.188 
 
The exact reasons for this greater favourability rating among peri-urban 
residents are not known, in part because there is little documentation on the 
nature of peri-urban life in Malawi. Cammack (2012) characterised the peri-
urban squatter settlements that surround Lilongwe and Blantyre as “sites of 
grinding poverty, unnatural hazards, and poor public goods delivery.”189 
Malawi’s most populous settlements include Ndirande, Mbayani, and Kachere 
in Blantyre, and Lauma and Cinsapo in Lilongwe. Residents of these townships 
are generally “impoverished translocals” whose livelihood strategies involve 
regular movement between villages and towns.190 
 
The AB data corroborate some 
limited qualitative evidence that 
Banda paid special attention to 
which communities she was 
targeting her poverty programmes, 
ensuring that she demonstrated her 
pro-poor commitments to 
Malawians living in quasi-urban 
townships and towns. For instance, 
after having devalued the kwacha, 
Banda announced that she would 
implement or scale up several social protection programmes that would mitigate 
the negative effects of structural adjustment. One example was the Public 
Works Programme.191 PWP, which had been part of the government’s (donor-
driven) social safety net agenda since 2003, was expanded in December 2012 
by about US$25 million. Banda’s decision to ceremonially launch the expansion 
                                                
188 The fact that the peri-urban category was initiated in the Round 5 survey (2012) causes 
potential problems for data analysis. Since peri-urban respondents on the whole had 
considerably different views from urban respondents, their aggregation with urban 
respondents before Round 5 may have significantly shifted the urban respondent data. 




190 For instance, Ndirande was documented as a “squatter colony” as far back as the early 
1970s; see H. C. Norwood, “Ndirande: A Squatter Colony in Malawi,” The Town Planning 
Review 43, no. 2 (1972): 135–50. 
191 “Malawi President Launches K10bn Public Works Programme: Economic Recovery,” 




from Bangwe Township near Blantyre suggests how she had targeted her 
programmes especially at alleviating peri-urban poverty. 
 
Banda’s rollout of the PWP to peri-urban areas likely augmented her popularity 
among this demographic that had likely been relatively more marginalised 
during previous governments. As Chirwa and Dorward (2013) documented, 
between the 2004/05 and 2010/11 Integrated Household Surveys (IHS), 
Malawi’s population had grown by around 20 percent, while rural poverty in 
Malawi had decreased only marginally.192 This undoubtedly forced many rural 
dwellers to seek employment opportunities for at least part of the year in urban 
areas, increasing strain on public resources. Peri-urban areas, however, lie in a 
sort of development “no man’s land”: township residents generally receive 
lesser public goods delivery than urban residents and may also not benefit from 
some social protection programmes that specifically target farmers. 
 
The president’s overtures to peri-urban dwellers marked a contrast from how 
the previous government had tackled social challenges in peri-urban areas. 
“Some people wrongly think it is only people in rural areas … that are living in 
abject poverty,” Banda noted a rally in Ndirande in which she touted the 
achievements of her Mudzi Transformation Trust. “No; it’s not only them 
because people in townships like in Ndirande here are worse off.”193 Banda had 
travelled on multiple occasions before to Ndirande, including during her tenure 
as vice-president to convey her condolences to a family whose son had died at 
the hands of police during the July 2011 anti-Mutharika demonstrations.194 
During the protests, peri-urban residents were apparently “particularly agitated,” 
Cammack (2011) noted, as “DPP pickup trucks loaded with youths carrying 
pangas” filled the streets to quell the unrest.195 Banda, by contrast, stood in 
solidarity with those peri-urban dwellers whom Mutharika had apparently 
persecuted. 
 
                                                
192 Ephraim Chirwa and Andrew Dorward, Agricultural Input Subsidies: The Recent Malawi 
Experience (Oxford University Press, 2013), 163. 
193 “JB Storms Ndirande, Assures Better Life for Malawi Citizens,” Malawi Nyasa Times - 
Malawi Breaking News in Malawi, December 9, 2013, 
http://www.nyasatimes.com/2013/12/09/jb-storms-ndirande-assures-better-life-for-malawi-
citizens/. 
194 Katie Lin, “VP Joyce Banda Visits Blantyre to Give Her Condolences - Blantyre,” 
Demotix, July 27, 2011, http://www.demotix.com/news/768186/vp-joyce-banda-visits-
blantyre-give-her-condolences-blantyre. 
195 Cammack (2011) recounted how “poorer peri-urban residents were particularly agitated” 
by the July 2011 protests in which “DPP pickup trucks loaded with youths carrying pangas” 




As they comprise less than 5 percent of all Malawians, peri-urban support for 
Banda’s presidency could not have alone carried her candidacy in Malawi’s 
largest urban districts of Lilongwe and Blantyre. Of Malawi’s three largest 
cities, Banda only earned a plurality of votes in the northern city of Mzuzu. 
Nonetheless, the fact that Banda performed generally well according to peri-
urban Malawians regardless of region provides significant further evidence that 
campaign issues—and not solely ethno-regional identity—informed voter 
choice in 2014. 
 
 
Salience of election issues in 2014: what were 
the possibilities for national consensus? 
 
The data indicate that there was not likely to have been one societal challenge or 
issue that was of salience to voters, as there had likely been in 2009 in the form 
of food security. According to 27 percent of 2014 survey respondents, food 
security was once again the most important issue that government should 
address. Yet as has been argued, no candidate fronted a distinctive brand that 
could convince voters nationwide that his or her party would be the one to 
address food-related concerns. Even though the 2014 DPP had appropriated 
their Bingu-era messaging around food production—going so far as to literally 
incorporate images of the deceased president into party regalia—other parties 
and candidates had jumped on the food security bandwagon through their 
support of fertiliser subsidies. For her part, Banda built herself up as an 
economic reformer and anti-poverty crusader. Yet neither were these issues of 
principal concern to likely more than a collective fourth of the electorate. In 
conclusion, it was unlikely that any candidate would be able to achieve the 
degree of national consensus that Bingu had achieved in 2009. 
 
The role that other 2014-specific election issues played in determining voter 
choice should not be underestimated, however. Most notably, Banda’s 
supposedly poor handling of the “Cashgate” scandal is thought to have reduced 
support for her candidacy in 2014.196 The AB data, however, suggest how 
Band’s handling of Cashgate, which likely predated her tenure of office, may 
actually have increased her popularity. A plurality of respondents (43%) said 
that government’s handling of Cashgate would make them likely to vote for 
Banda in the election as compared to 33 percent who said they would be 
unlikely to vote for her as a consequence. Another 11 percent said that Cashgate 
would not influence their vote. This finding, contrary to anecdotal observations, 
                                                
196 Boniface Dulani and Kim Yi Dionne, “Presidential, Parliamentary, and Local Government 
























suggests that Cashgate did not have a strong net effect on Banda’s popularity, 
and if anything even increased slightly her electoral support as she cultivated 
her image as a reformer, having ordered dozens of arrests and commissioned an 
investigative report on the scandal. 
 
The outcome of the 2014 election, in which candidates generally won pluralities 
in areas only where they had ethnic or regional ties, suggests that election 
issues—and branding, therefore—did not play a paramount role in determining 
the result. At the same time, the role of issues and candidate positions should 
not be discounted. According to 40 percent of 2014 AB survey respondents, 
candidates’ economic and development policies were the most important 
difference between the ruling and opposition parties. By comparison, just 13 
percent of respondents identified the ethnicity or region of party leaders to be 
the most important difference between the parties. This finding suggests that the 
candidates’ positions on substantive issues—not ethno-regional identity—were 
of greater salience to voters in 2014. Unfortunately, these somewhat 
contradictory insights cannot easily be reconciled and underscore the 
complexity of electoral choice in Malawi.197 Ultimately, further research should 
do more to disaggregate respondent data according to demographic 
characteristics other than inhabitancy type including age, gender, and class. 
Understanding who are Malawi’s “swing voters” would, moreover, bring 
                                                
197 Further issues also clouded determination of election issue salience through analysis of the 
AB data. Gender norms in Malawi, for instance, are still predominant and likely coloured 
voters’ beliefs about whether Banda was qualified to be president. Indeed, 37 percent of AB 
respondents agreed with the statement “Men make better political leaders than women, and 
should be elected rather than women.” This bias necessarily confounds any gender-
independent comparison of candidates’ political brands. 
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